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Abstract
Chapter 1
Could the empires that ruled Eastern Europe for centuries
and the formal institutions that they implemented have left
an imprint on current formal and informal institutions of
modern states? This paper sheds light on the legacy of the
administrative system of the Ottoman Empire in contempo-
rary states in the region. I investigate a causal mechanism
that led to divergent paths of state building and rule of law,
interpreted as attitudes toward corruption. The boundary be-
tween the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire was set in the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, contempo-
raneous with a fiscal shock and a crucial change in the Ot-
toman fiscal system. This is identified as the historical treat-
ment effect. First, a theoretical model is constructed, focus-
ing on effects of tax system change, which encouraged un-
controlled predatory behavior and spread of abuse and rent
extraction in the Ottoman Empire. Using Geographic Infor-
mation System methods and regression discontinuity analy-
sis with household survey data I investigate persistence of
different attitudes about bribery on both sides of the former
border. Findings evidence higher willingness to bribe on the
Ottoman hereditary lands. These findings are robust to con-
trols. Last, the persistent effect of weak institutions on growth
is estimated using household consumption and light inten-
sity data as proxies for development.
Chapter2
Reforms often occur in waves, seemingly cascading from
country to country. We argue that such reform waves can
xvi
be driven by informational spillovers: uncertainty about the
outcome of reform is reduced by learning from the experi-
ence of similar countries. We motivate this hypothesis with a
simple theoretical model and then test it empirically. We find
evidence of informational spillovers both with respect to both
political and economic liberalization. While the previous lit-
erature has focused only on economic reform, we find that
the spillovers are particularly important for political changes
Chapter 3
A wide literature identifies trust as an important prerequi-
site for well-functioning markets and overall economic per-
formance. A more recent body of research highlights his-
tory as a determinant of trust. Despite the level of atten-
tion the topic of trust has enjoyed, the literature highlights
important issues with the lack of detail in existing data, col-
lected mostly at the country level. I aim to improve on the
coarse resolution offered by existing data with the help of
a methodological innovation. This study analyzes the im-
pact of history on generalized trust, using data from an inter-
national peer-to-peer hospitality exchange network, Couch-
Surfing.org. The geographic focus is on Romania, the ter-
ritory of which was formerly divided between the Habs-
burg and Ottoman Empires. Previous studies reveal im-
portant differences in generalized trust between Romanias
previously-Ottoman, provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia,
and the formerly-Habsburg province of Transylvania, with
the former two lower in generalized trust than the latter. This
study uses the local density of CouchSurfing.org member-
ship as a proxy measure for generalized trust. Findings con-
firm that CouchSurfing membership is higher in Transylva-
nia than elsewhere, thus providing evidence for the validity
of using CouchSurfing membership as a proxy for general-
xvii
ized trust. Our approach, using spatial regression, yields a
basis for extrapolating measures of generalized trust to areas
where little survey data exists.
Chapter 4
Some aspects of financial reform positively affect economic
growth. The size of credit to the private credit also positively
affects economic growth. We argue that these effects might
be stronger or weaker depending on countrys historical lega-
cies and its influence on culture and attitudes towards au-
thority, rule of law as well as the importance of financial in-
termediation. Therefore we test correlation between (indexes
of) historical legacies and financial reform indicators (or/and
the size of financial system) for a set of transition (emerging)
economies that experienced centuries of (different) imperial
rule
xviii
Chapter 1
The Rule of Karlowitz:
Fiscal Change and
Institutional Persistence
1.1 Introduction
At the end of the 17th century, the Treaty of Karlowitz drew a line be-
tween the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. At about the same time, the
Ottoman Empire adopted a tax farming strategy that created widespread
corruption and undermined the rule of law. Could empires that ruled
Eastern Europe region for centuries and the formal institutions that they
implemented have left an imprint on the current formal and informal
institutions of modern states?
In this paper, I analyze the impact of these imperial pre-communist
institutions on contemporary formal and informal institutional outcomes
in the region. Specifically, I consider the shadow of centuries of domi-
nance of the Habsburg- Prussian monarchy versus the legacy of the Ot-
toman Empire.
To motivate the argument, a simple theoretical model shows how the
fiscal system, based on auction of tax farming rights, encouraged corrup-
tion and undermined the certainty of property and contract rights. Next,
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GIS data is used to overlay the Karlowitz line on modern boundaries.
A first correlation analysis at country level of the effect of the respective
imperial legacies on contemporary institutions and therefore on growth
motivates the bulk of this research. Therefore, I use a household survey
and a question on attitudes about bribing public officials to test for this
legacy on the divergent behavior toward rule of law. Geographic Infor-
mation System data combined with regression discontinuity analysis at
the border are evidence of the higher willingness to bribe and therefore a
lack of rule of law in the Ottoman hereditary lands. Findings are robust
to controls. Last, household consumption and light intensity data are
used as proxy for development at the border level to test the divergence
among the regions.
I compare modern nations that lay within the Ottoman border in 1699
to those that did not. To show that the imperial legacy persisted after 20th
century national boundaries were drawn, I look more closely at countries
whose territory was divided between the Ottoman and both Habsburg
and Prussian Empires, and also at the nations that constituted the for-
mer Yugoslavia. I also consider how long a territory was under Ottoman
control and how far it was from the dividing line. I find that a tax sys-
tem that encouraged corruption and undermined the rule of law has had
long-lasting effects on institutions. Institutions are widely recognized
as an important factor driving regional growth divergence. This paper
investigates this link with respect to the growth and institutional diver-
gence between Central Eastern Europe and Baltic countries (CEEB) and
South Eastern Europe states (SEE) by accounting for long term histori-
cal legacies which affect final economic performance through the chan-
nel of the institutional framework. CEEB and SEE are based on OECD
groupings of 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that were
formerly under communist government. The CEE countries may be fur-
ther divided into CEEB (which includes the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland) and SEE
(which includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Mace-
donia, Romania and Serbia). With the communist collapse in Eastern
Europe, the market-oriented transition started off with the implosion of a
2
fixed political-economic system and institutional framework. That insti-
tutional framework had functioned despite its well-known problems. As
transition experience has accumulated, it has become clearer that over-
all economic performance depends not only on the persistent disparity
between progress as regards liberalization and privatization, but also on
the development of political and economic institutions. At the beginning
of the 1990s, economists studying output drops in the economies of the
former communist block emphasized the importance of liberalization,
macroeconomic stabilization, and privatization (key elements of the so-
called Washington Consensus). Therefore, most research from that time
focused on macroeconomic indicators and the speed of reforms. Twenty
years later, most investigations of transition economies and the latest
challenges of the recent financial crisis seem to agree on the importance
of regional institutions, and thus institution-building as a fundamental
prerequisite for further economic growth and convergence.
There are clearly large and persistent differences in economic devel-
opment and institutions across Europe. Many SEE countries, not only
those with communist legacies, have consistently grown more slowly
than other less-developed Eastern European countries. Slovenia, for ex-
ample, has already overtaken Greece in terms of GDP per capita, this
despite having to grapple with the transformation from communism to
a market economy and democracy during the last 20 years. The devel-
opment economics literature strongly suggests that these differences in
economic development may have their origins in formal institutions and
informal values implanted centuries ago, when parts of Europe were in-
corporated into various empires. In this paper, I analyze the impact of
institutions on growth for a set of 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries, specifically by examining the institutional legacies of the Ot-
toman, Prussian, and Habsburg Empires. I argue that formal institutions
as well as informal norms of behavior imposed in these countries by their
respective colonial powers have had a lasting impact on the institutional
environment. I find that these institutional legacies continue to drive
differences in economic growth between the CEEB and SEE countries to
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this day. I further identify governance as a channel of persistence for
the imperial historical imprint. To do this, I use the historical border of
the Ottoman Empire (Karlowitz, 1699) to divide Eastern Europe into two
regions: one region long administered by Ottoman rulers, and another
region that was not. Institutional characteristics of the Ottoman Empires
local administrative system persist in current data on the behavior of cit-
izens toward public administration in the region (once Rumelia) where
that system was in place. The paper is organized in the following sec-
tions. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 introduces the
historical narrative.Section 4 develops a simple theoretical model that
highlights the mechanism of the fiscal change. Section 5 describes the
data and provides the methodological framework. Section 6 contains the
main results (with checks for their robustness), and section 7 concludes.
1.2 Formal and Informal Institutions: an
overview
Several studies in transition have argued that market and state institu-
tions are vital for the CEE transition economies performance, because
these institutions provide incentives for investment and innovation, as
well as sources of growth. Moreover, in transition countries with strong
institutions, the ability of politicians to extract rents has been relatively
low. Institution-building for transition economies has been emphasized
strongly as crucial for the transition process (Roland, 2000, 2003, 2004,
2009, Polishchuk, 2001, Fischer Sahay 2004). Laeven and Back (2005)
identify the dependence on natural resources and the historical experi-
ence of countries during socialism as the major determinants of institu-
tional paths.
Institutions can be conceptualized as the rules of the game in a so-
ciety or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction (Douglas North, 1990). As underlined by Greif (2006),
they encompass informal constraints (norms and beliefs) and formal con-
straints (rules and organizations), which are exogenous to the individ-
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ual and which conjointly generate a regularity of behavior. Following
the growing body of literature on the so-called New institutional eco-
nomics, institutions are defined as social arrangements that reduce trans-
action costs and promote economic growth. The Coase Theorem (Coase
1960) highlights the social efficiency of economic institutions as crucial
to the outcome of negotiations between economic parties because in-
stitutions influence the potential for parties to account for externalities.
As Williamson (2005) argues, institutions can embody the rules of the
game in the economics of governance. Many early scholars like Adam
Smith, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill emphasized the importance of
economic institutions. More recent scholars, such as Demsetz (1967), De
Sotto (2000), and Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2004, 2008) underline the impor-
tance of economic institutions in influencing the structure of economic
incentives in a society. In The Rise of The Western World: A New Eco-
nomic History, Douglass North and Robert Thomas argue that factors
like innovation, capital accumulation, and education are not causes of
growth, so much as they are growth. They further argue that the funda-
mental explanation for comparative growth is to be found in institutions.
Several studies have shown that cross-country differences in output per
worker cannot fully be explained by cross-country variation in the stock
of physical and human capital, and that these stocks fail to converge over
time. Hall and Jones (1999), finding a large amount of variation in the
level of the Solow residual across the 127 countries that they considered,
suggest that the differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and
therefore output per worker are driven by differences in social infrastruc-
ture, namely in institutions and government policies. The development
of economic institutions depends in part on the distribution of political
power in society, which accounts for the distribution of resources and ex-
ternal shocks (Acemoglu et al 2004, 2008). Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2008) argue for the impact of culture and the causal impact of socially
transmitted norms of behavior on economic outcomes. Roland (2004)
highlights the distinction between slow-moving institutions like culture
(which includes values, beliefs, and social norms), and fast-moving in-
stitutions, which can change more quickly, like political institutions.
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Greif (1994) argues: different cultures... generate different sets of beliefs
about how people behave and this can alter the set of equilibria for a
given specification of institutions. He considers culture in its evolution
as closely related to technology and scientific knowledge. As emphasized
by Roland (2004), it then becomes crucial to understand the factors that
may affect the evolution of cultures over time. Tabellini (2008), explain-
ing divergence on several political, institutional or economic outcomes in
regions of Europe, takes culture into account. Considered as individual
values the author indicates this as the channel through which history af-
fects institutional outcomes. The author notes observed differences in the
functioning of bureaucracies between many countries that have identical
laws and incentives, and in many instances similar resources. These dif-
ferences underline the importance of this historical persistence on policy
effectiveness. Rodrik et al (2004) use instrumental variables for institu-
tions and trade to estimate the respective contributions of institutions,
geography, and trade for the determination of income levels around the
world. They show that the quality of institutions, especially with respect
to property rights and the rule of law, matter more than either geography
or trade. La Porta et al. (2004) point out the importance of human capital
as a basic source for growth controlling for the reverse causality on in-
stitution building and the importance of legal origins (2008), and hence
of different historical legacies on economic performance. Roland (2004)
considers the dynamics of complementarities between political and cul-
tural institutions and the importance of institutional clusters for growth.
He also emphasizes the importance of understanding slow moving insti-
tutions (Jellema, Roland 2009). Greif (2006) argues that history is a major
determinant of the persistence of institutions, as well as a major factor in
their endogenous change; he also argues that past institutions affect sub-
sequent institutional development. In addition, a growing body of lit-
erature affirms the importance of slow and incremental development of
institutions, especially informal institutions (North 1990). Other research
has found that distant historical events can play a crucial role in deter-
mining institutional or economic performance for example, the effect of
colonial legacies on economic performance in less-developed countries
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(Brown 1996, Acemoglu et al. 2002, 2005, 2008, Djankov et al. 2003, En-
german et al. 2002). Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011) focus on collec-
tivism and individualism as important aspects of cultural transmission
contributing to divergent growth between countries. Fukuyama (2004)
argues that the development of formal institutions is strongly affected
by cultural factors. Like others, he stresses the role of social virtues and
specifically trust in explaining the correlation between a countrys reli-
gion and its economic modernization.
The idea that institutions, particularly informal institutions like be-
liefs and social norms may persist over time is widely accepted in the
literature. These informal institutions affect formal institutions that are
shown to have a strong effect on growth. Among others are the rule of
law and the level of corruption. Social norms and beliefs are often consid-
ered direct channels through which historical background and historical
legacies persist. But the question of the impact of historical legacies on
former transition economies has not gained much attention in the liter-
ature, especially with respect to Eastern Europe. One notable exception
is the seminal contribution of Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007), which explores
the impact of historical legacies on institutional development of Eastern
European economies. Other exceptions include recent research by Grose-
jan on the effect of historical spatial proximity on cultural transmission
(2011) and the persistence of former Ottoman institutions on financial
sector development today (2011).
A recent working paper by Becker and al. (2011) develops a close ar-
gument to this research focusing on Eastern Europe and Ukraine. Their
findings shows individuals living on the former Habsbourg territory to
have higher levels of trust and lower levels of corruption toward state
institutions and officials. In my analysis I use a clear analytical narrative
and a simple theoretical model to identify the institutional change that
caused the differences found. Based on the institutional change, I can
uniquely identify the relevant historical border in contemporary Eastern
Europe and use the discontinuity created by this border to identify the
predicted differences.
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1.3 A History of Eastern Europe
The story of two CEEB countries (Slovenia and the Czech Republic) and
two SEE countries (Serbia and Bulgaria) hints that 20th century history
is not the sole determinant of institutions in Eastern Europe. As argued
by Dimitrova-Grajzl, the fall of the communist legal system was accom-
panied by a desire to diverge from socialist ideology, and therefore trig-
gered a return to traditions, norms, and rules from earlier history. This
hypothesis is motivated by the case study of two sets of countries in
which similar socialist economic models were implemented, but that still
display large differences in development and institutional performance.
As argued by Dimitrova-Grajzl, Serbia and Slovenia were both republics
of the FYF, and thus benefited from Titos more independent model of
socialism, while in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic a more classical so-
cialist economic model was implemented. Despite this shared experience
of Serbia and Slovenia, on the one hand, and Bulgaria and the Czech Re-
public, on the other, data on growth and other indicators show current
similarities between Serbia and Bulgaria, and between Slovenia and the
Czech Republic. These similarities are also clearly visible in comparisons
of institutional performance.
The experiences of these Eastern European States illustrate the im-
portance of long-term historical legacies. Bulgaria, Serbia, and Slovenia
were totally incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
but their current economic development is sharply different from that
of all the other formerly communist countries. I argue not only that long
term historical legacies of those countries matter but that the legacy of the
Ottoman Empire on successor states has a different imprint on todays di-
vergent institutional frameworks (formal and informal) compared to that
of successor states with a Habsburg-Prussian legacy.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 inaugurated fundamental economic
and political changes in Eastern Europe. Transition refers to the pro-
cess through which open market oriented economies were established in
these countries. According to the EBRD (1994) transition from a com-
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mand to a market economy is the movement towards a new system
for the generation and allocation of resources. It involves also chang-
ing and creating the institutional framework. A strong majority of inter-
national institutions and economists agree that certain features of mar-
ket economies must be established in any successful transition. These
key features include: private enterprises; competitive markets; sound
institutions (financial and otherwise) to serve as a basis for commer-
cial transactions; and the fiscal and monetary policies required to cre-
ate and maintain macroeconomic stability. In the early part of the tran-
sition process, macroeconomic stabilization, price liberation, extensive
privatization, and other reforms were emphasized as necessary for in-
tegrating countries in transition with the world economy. Twenty years
after the start of transition, the CEEB and SEE countries appear to have
diverged, both in terms of growth measured by GDP per capita and in
terms of the Human Development Index. A major impediment to accu-
rately assessing the influence of institutions on economic performance
during transition is the difficulty of identifying theoretically sound mea-
sures of institutional performance that are relevant for growth (Coricelli
et al. 2002). Campos (1999) uses the concept of governance, as devel-
oped in the World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI), to put forward a
set of indicators for different institutional dimensions of governance for
the transition countries. This concept of governance includes the func-
tioning of civil society and of institutional performance that are relevant
for growth (Coricelli et al. 2002). Campos (1999) uses the concept of gov-
ernance, as developed in the World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI),
to put forward a set of indicators for different institutional dimensions
of governance for the transition countries. This concept of governance
includes the functioning of civil society.
Good governance requires an efficient, well-functioning bureaucracy,
capable of adjusting to changing social needs. For good governance, the
legal framework must also be appropriate to the circumstances and must
command broad consensus. Civil society should be strong, to encourage
participation in public affairs. Improving the quality of governance and
institutions has been a key point on the integration agenda of the Eu-
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ropean Union, as well as for SEE countries integrating into the world
economy. Formal institutions seem to be weaker in the SEE region than
in other Eastern European countries: corruption seems higher, while the
rule of law, political voice, accountability, political stability, and govern-
ment effectiveness all appear to be weaker. Western Balkan countries
appear to have the weakest institutions, given the prevalence of corrup-
tion and lack of rule of law, among other things. The EU accession pro-
cess is claimed to have a positive effect on the institutional framework,
since the required institutional reforms are so rigorous. On the other
hand progress on a set of institutions is required for a definitive and pos-
itive outcome of the process, highlighting a countrys specific domestic
peculiarities. Thus it is important to consider the historical legacies of
countries and regions.
1.3.1 A Tale of Two Legacies
Before the common experiences of two world wars and half a century
under communist rule, Central Eastern Europe (comprising Central Eu-
rope, the Baltics, and South Eastern Europe) was broken into three and
ruled for centuries by the Prussian, Habsburg, and Ottoman Empires. In
addition, the Russian Empire ruled over the Baltic countries and part of
Poland from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the
twentieth century.
The aim of this paper is not to define all distinct features of each em-
pire with historical precision, but to explore the cultural and institutional
imprint of the Ottoman legacy in South Eastern Europe. However, this
section provides an overview of the relevant history of these empires,
starting with the fifteenth century and finishing with the disaggregation
of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires in the early twentieth century.
Although Russian legacies are taken into account in the methodologi-
cal analysis, the main characteristics of this empire are not discussed in
this section. This is because this research focuses on the institutional and
cultural legacies of the other empires, especially with respect to their ad-
ministrative systems, and on the effect of a former border of the Ottoman
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Empire, making the Russian legacy less relevant.
The Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg, Russian, and Prussian em-
pires engaged in a long series of wars for control of Central and East-
ern Europe. The Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 set a boundary between the
Habsburg and Ottoman Empire. The land that the Ottomans ceded to the
Habsburgs included much of modern Hungary. I have used Geographic
Inforation System to overlay the Karlowitz line over modern European
boundaries. The line roughly divides CEEB from SEE countries, and a
few SEE countries in particular, Serbia and Romania straddle that line.
In other words, certain modern states contain both historically Ottoman
and historically Habsburg-Prussian territory. The Karlowitz boundary
sheds light on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire that persists despite the
shared 20th century experience of modern states.
After 1699, the area of Europe still within Ottoman control, called
Rumelia by the Turks, was roughly equivalent to the Balkans. With this
huge expansion at the turn of the eighteenth century, the Habsburg Em-
pire began its ascension, while the Ottoman Empire began its internal
administrative, social, and economic decline in the region and elsewhere.
Not long before the Treaty of Karlowitz, a change in the tax system
was introduced in the Ottoman Empire: the tax farming. The novelty
was the way the tax rights were assigned. An auction system granted
the land to the highest bidder. The government start granting property
rights through a bidding process that lead to immediate cash revenues.
The right to the tax farm was acquired upon winning the auction, includ-
ing the right to subcontract the revenue collection to smaller tax farmers.
Few years before the treaty was signed the life leases of tax farming ma-
likane substituted the short term tax farming.
As well as the ayans (local lords), local committees were appointed
to maintain district level registers. With time their power became uncon-
trolled and a source of conflict with the central government, as well as
a source of exploitation of the local population considering that usurers
and tax-farmers were also members of these committees. Tax farmers
started collecting other taxes illegally from peasants and increasing their
power over their consolidated cifliks. The government lost further con-
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trol over the locals granted with autonomy in controlling their districts.
The ayan hierarchies started exploiting furthermore their power as land-
holders, leasees, local reallocation committees and as recruitment agents
for war needs. The system was so lucrative that even during the 20th
century in Bosnia the word malikane (life lease) was used as a synonym
for easy money (Inalcik 1994). The system created great opportunities
for rent extraction for the agents and at different times also collusion be-
tween them. The era of the rise of ayans in Rumelia had only started. The
two centuries that followed saw an increasing level of abuse towards the
local population, corruption, and increasing bribery and distrust.
Furthermore, as Balla and Johnson (2009) argue, the highly decen-
tralised tax system lead to manipulation of the rules of the game by
the Sultan, and property rights became increasingly uncertain. In 1714,
the Sultan retracted contracts in most provinces. He reinstated them in
1717 at prices nearly 50 percent above the original bids. This policy lead
to a cycle of disrespect for the law: the ayans began to ignore the law
and transmitted tax farms from one generation to the next did not even
give the collected excise to the central government. State revenues fell
even further and provinces started experiencing the rise of a class of ex-
bandits that took hold of some territories and administered them in full
autonomy from Istanbul.
The rule of law is a measure of governance. In both empires, the
rule of law was in the hands of the Sovereign (Habsburgs) or the Sul-
tan (Ottomans). The principle of the Circle of Equity was as impor-
tant for the Sultan as the respect of Courts and their jurisdiction was for
the Sovereign prince. However, Rulers of contemporary Eastern Europe
north of the Danube and Sava, whether they were Prussians, Hungari-
ans, or Habsburgs, shared an important common trait: their strong ties
with the (local) nobility. The nobles maintained their privileged status
and their influence through wars, changes of power and princes, unions
of kingdoms (i.e Austro Hungary) and fights for national identity. Even
after the Russian occupation in Latvia and Estonia, the Prussian nobility
still had control of all the lands and the administrative system. The no-
ble class in these regions had a similar influence on their supreme rulers
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as that of the parliamentary system in the western monarchies. As the
tax farming system was eroding the rule of law in the Ottoman Empire,
the rule of law was being strengthened under state institutions in the
Austro-Hungarian and Prussian empires.
In contrast, the Ottoman Empire based its administrative system on
the Devishmire practice: recruiting young slaves and training them as
bureaucrats and solders (Jannisaries). The structure and goals of the em-
pire were predicated on continued conquest (Fleischer, 1986) but no one
had any right or could exercise any authority over the land and peasantry
without a mandate from the Sultan (Inalcik 1973). The sipahis military
were granted land and tax collection rights in payment for their service to
the Sultan. None of these practices built institutions based on predictable
rules.
While the end of the 17th century marked a discontinuity for lands
within the Ottoman Empire, the empires north of the Karlowitz line con-
tinued a process of building strong state institutions. In the same pe-
riod, arts were sponsored widely in the Habsburg empire by the aris-
tocracy, the dynasty and the counter-reformatory church with a great in-
flux of German culture into Bohemian lands (Kann, 1974). Challenged
by the Turkish wars the need to have tight relationships with the nobil-
ity became even more important for the Habsburgs. With the treaty of
Karlowitz, the Habsburgs regained Hungary (including Transylvania).
After initial struggles and revolts, the Hungarian nobles recognised the
importance of the alliance, and the Habsburg Empire became the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. The era of Joseph II and Maria Theresa are remem-
bered for the great conquests and spirit of reform in continuity with the
process of state building of a power now called the Austro-Hungarian
Empire.
The Habsburg-Prussian legacy is mixed. Peasant revolts during the
late fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries were common to both empires.
However,the Prussians left an imprint on culture and state building that
extended beyond the Baltic region and Poland. German law cities spread
throughout the northern half of Central Eastern Europe, reaching as far
as Hungary and Bohemia (todays Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slove-
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nia). Those German law cities are argued to be the basis of the Habsburg
rule (Magocsi 1993). The Habsburgs joined their forces with the Hungar-
ians to become Austro-Hungary in the late nineteenth century, a union
that lasted until the end of World War I (1918). The legacies of the Habs-
burg and Prussian Empires differed from that of the Ottoman Empire in
many key ways, especially with respect to the spread of education, the
written press, the expansion of trade, and the effect of the Protestant ref-
ormation. The spread of Protestantism was associated with disapproval
of corruption and had a positive effect on social capital (Putnam 1993;
Fukuyama 1995; La Porta et al. 1997). Furthermore, the Habsburgs abol-
ished serfdom, reformed the tax system, and starting in 1785 increased
peasants rights. The condition of the peasantry was nevertheless the
same. In contrast, serfdom survived almost until almost the decline of
the Empire itself in the European territories ruled by the Ottomans. In
addition, the Weberian public administration of the Habsburg European
regions is thought to have had a higher quality of public bureaucracy that
led to better interactions between citizens and the government (Becker et
al 2011).
1.3.2 The Fiscal Divide
Despite the differences before the wars of the second half of the seven-
teenth century and specifically the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), both em-
pires were engaged a continuous and ongoing process of building an ad-
ministrative and fiscal system and faced similar struggles, while impos-
ing tax burdens on the local population. After the treaty, the Habsburg
monarchy (later on becoming Austro-Hungarian Empire ) continued the
process of building strong state institutions and tight relationship with
the nobility of the hereditary lands. In contrast, the drastic changes in fis-
cal policy implemented by the Ottoman Empire with the tax farm reform
of late 17th century irreversibly changed the future of administrative and
state building in the region.
Notwithstanding the problems that the Ottoman regime in Eastern
Europe had, several historians argue that the real effect of decline started
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after the war ended in 1699. After the Karlowitz treaty, other wars
and treaties followed with borders being redesigned on each side of
the Danube-Sava rivers. The Ottomans first lost and then regained ter-
ritories. There where no substantial change to the borders assigned
from the treaty of Karlowitz in Rumelia until the beginning of 20th cen-
tury when the Austro Hungarian empire annexes part of contemporary
Bosnia Herzegovina.
But an the important change in the region was the one on the Fiscal
system of the Ottoman Empire in the late seventeenth century.
In the centuries before the Treaty of Karlowitz was signed the Ot-
toman fiscal sytem shared common aspects with other ruling monarchies
(France among others). The dominant fiscal system was the Timar sys-
tem: Timar holders were selected among the military class and leased
taxation rights given as salaries for their regular military services. Sev-
eral authors evidence that most taxes collected were in kind and regu-
lated by law from the Sultan himself. In order to prevent abuses, specific
laws would determine the time and amount to be collected. The Cen-
tral Government had in place a system of control and law enforcement
through local law enforcement agents (Metin and al.
Faced with increasing war costs,and proliferation of tax exemption
(vakif) as argued by Inalcik, the Empire experience great cash constraints
and a fiscal shock. Therefore the the availability of liquid funds became
the priority. The tax system gradually convert toward auctioning of
property rights for the highest price. The Iltizam (short term tax fam-
ing) system is introduced and around 1694 is further converted into the
Malicane system (life term lease).
Different scholars would argue that this change created a system of
abuse, corruption and the exploitation of the population by rapacious
tax-farmers. Further we try to uncover the reasons that lead to this out-
come.
In a comparative study of the evolution of the Ottoman and French
fiscal systems, Balla and Johnson (2009) argue that, uncertainty with re-
gard to these tax farming contract was prevalent. As the authors would
cite ’only in 1714, the sultan retracted contracts and re auctioned them
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in 1717 at prices nearly 50 percent above the original bids’ and that ’
whenever a better bid was made, the tax farmer either paid the differ-
ence or lost his right to collect’. Further more the establishment of the ’tax
farming’ ’ altered the governments relationship with local law enforce-
ment agents and reduced the effectiveness of control mechanisms’ as ar-
gued by Cosgel and al. (2011). The power of control over the farming
lands was often delegate to local lords from the bidders for even shorter
amount of time. The combination of these factors and the great necessity
to pay the loans contracted for paying the highest price of the auction
lead to what is described as period of great abuse corruption and de-
molition of ’the circle of equity’ in the ottoman Empire. Fleet (2003 )and
others would describe the rise of tax farming system as the quintessential
expression of the Ottoman decline.
I argue that this fiscal change and the tax farming institution with its
auction system of land ownership marked the great divide in the build-
ing of state and administrative systems and therefore people’s attitude
toward the rule of law in the regions governed from the Ottoman Empire.
This fiscal policy that lead to further uncertainty and exploitation by the
beginning of eighteenth century and left an imprint of double agent prin-
cipal problems in the administrative and governance sector in the areas
ruled by the Ottomans after the Treaty of Karlowitz: the interactions be-
tween the State and ayans and between ayans and peasants. This legacy
of distrust of public offices or local administration and corruption for
personal gain is the institutional imprint of long term history reflected
by present indicators of governance and norms of behavior of the local
population of these regions. The roving bandit type of rule in the region
left an imprint that persisted despite the wars and decades of imposed
communist regime.
1.4 Fiscal systems and rent extraction
In this section a simplified theoretical model sheds light on the incentives
for investment in the future and extractive behavior of state administra-
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tors before and after the change in the Ottoman administrative and fiscal
system.
I consider the empire (or kingdom) as split up into different regions.
Before the reform each region was assigned to a member of nobility or
timariot (from the military class) who collected taxes for the ruler (Em-
peror or Sultan). The ruler decides the total rent that could be extracted
from each region and how much the lord (timariot) that levied the taxes
for him could keep.
Each region has production capacity equal to Yt = AKt where A is
the common technology and Kt the capital stock or production capacity
(including institutional and administrative system).
The ruler can than assign this production to investment It to increase fu-
ture production capacity, or toward the rents extracted by himself and
the lord Rt.
As the Ruler (or his heir) is going to be in place for a longer period of
time, he cares about the rent in the future R2 while he has a discount rate
β. His instantaneous utility is defined as Vt = ln(Rt).
Capital depreciates at rate δ such that the capital in the future (period 2)
is equal to K2 = (1− δ)K1 + I1.
The maximization problem of the Ruler (prince/sultan) then becomes
max
R1,R2
pi (R1, R2) : pi = ln(R1) + β ln (R2)
st. AKt = Rt + It =
K2 = (1− δ)K1 + I1.
Note that there is no reason to invest in period 2 so that I2 = 0, the
rent in period 2 is then AK2. Substitution of the constraints into the goal
function yields:
max
R1
pi (R1) = ln(R1) + β ln (A [(1− δ)K1 +AK1 −R1])
The objective function is concave in R1 and has a unique maximum de-
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fined by the first order condition:
∂pi
∂R1
=
1
R1
− βA
A [(1− δ)K1 +AK1 −R1] = 0
βAR1 = A [(1− δ)K1 +AK1 −R1]
(1 + β)AR1 = A [(1− δ)K1 +AK1]
R1 =
(1− δ)K1 +AK1
1 + β
The rent extracted in the first period is smaller than production ca-
pacity iff
1− δ < Aβ
That is, if, relative to 1 − δ, the technology is productive enough or
the value assigned to the future future high enough, positive investment
in the future is optimal.
After the auctioning of tax farming rights was adopted in the 17th
century, regions did not change, so the production capacity is still Yt =
AKt.
But the sultan decided that the rent could be extracted by the one paying
the highest bid while the taxes where established in terms of a lump sum
per year. The bidders know that the benefits will accrue in the period
defined by the property rights over the auction.1 Assume that the local
lords have the same utility function as the ruler U = ln(ct). Where ct is
the amount of money they manage to extract for themselves. Local lords
that do not manage to procure a region can extract no money so have a
utility of 0.
Every period all lords sent in a bid, bi for the regions they want to
levy taxes on. The maximum rent that can be extracted for a region is
again it’s total production.
Backward induction leads to full rent extraction in the final period.
Then the bidders will be willing to bid up to AK2 in period 2, leading to
full Bertrand-like price competition. As long as there are at least 2 lords
1from 1 year to 20 years life time lease assuming an average age at the time of the
auction and life expectations
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bidding on each region (and they don’t collude) the ruler will extract
all rents of the second period. Knowing that none of the rents in the
second period will acrue to them, none of the lords has any incentive to
invest in period 1. During period 1 bidding again all lords will have the
incentive to bid up to the maximum production capacity, and also this
period bidding results in Bertrand competition. Such that in equilibrium:
bit = AKt, I1 = 0, K2 = (1− δ)K1
The model suggests that the fiscal change in the Ottoman empire at
the end of the 17th century leads to a lack of incentives to invest in con-
structing a functioning state and rule of law. If this empire left a lasting
imprint on the culture and development of these areas, the effects of this
lack of investment should still be visible in the current time.
Proposition1: The Ottoman side of the Karlowitz border shows lower
levels of corruption and lack of rule of law.
Proposition2: The Ottoman side of the Karlowitz border shows lower
level of development.
To highlight the distortive effects of the fiscal change uncertainty, risk
aversion and credit constraints are not considered in this simplified mo-
del. The model also exclude the possibility of selections effects which
would have aggravated the predatory behavior.2
1.5 Data and Methodology
The data used in this study are collected mainly from two sets of sources:
first, traditional economic data such as institutional data from the World
Bank, the EBRD, and a few indexes used mainly as covariates in the tran-
sition literature; second, atlases and other historical sources integrated
with GIS for a multidisciplinary narrative analysis approach.
2considering different utility functions the local lord willing to extract the highest rent
will also bid the highest price
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The methodology follows a cross-country analysis with an IV ap-
proach, an analytical narrative approach, and a regression discontinu-
ity analysis with household data. Finally, light intensity data is used as
proxy for development around the historical boundaries delimited by
the Karlowitz Treaty
The country-level institutional data are collected from the World Gov-
ernance Indicators created by Kauffman et al. for 1996 to 2008. Data on
GDP per capita is taken from the World Bank indicators. Sources of other
control variables come from both the EBRD and the World Bank over the
years 1989 to 2008.
I argue that while these indicators are usually mentioned for their
measurement problems, they add value to the analysis because they cap-
ture many of the formal and informal institutional features that affect
quality of governance.
The Life in Transition data are collected from the EBRD in 2006 in
the 29 transition economies: 1000 interviews divided into 20 primary
statistic units PSU per country. For the purpose of this study, only data
from CEE countries is analyzed. Households are geocoded on the basis
of the information provided about their latitude and longitude.
To analyze the quality of governance in these CEE countries, I will fo-
cus on the responses to the following survey question: “In your opinion,
how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial
payments/gifts in these situations?” Households are asked to reply to
this question in regards to various scenarios that involve dealing with
public officials: interacting with traffic police; requesting official docu-
ments (e.g. passport, visa, birth or marriage certificate, land registration,
etc.); interacting with the police in relation to other matters; going to
court for a civil matter; receiving medical treatment in the public health
system; receiving public higher education (university, college); request-
ing unemployment benefits; and requesting other social benefits. The
answers (outcomes) use a five-point scale, with 1 meaning “Never” and
5 meaning “Always”. Observations (responses) and means for house-
holds at various distances on either side of the reconstructed Karlowitz
border are described in table 6.
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1.5.1 Cross-Country Analysis
Like Beck and Laeven (2005), I examine the importance of institution
building for growth during transition, with a focus on the sixteen Eastern
European economies. I argue that formal and informal contemporary in-
stitutions in these countries reflect the legacies of the empires that ruled
the region for centuries. These institutional legacies may account for a
substantial portion of the divergence that is currently visible between
the South Eastern European countries and those of the Central and Baltic
region.
Data for the cross-country analysis comes from the World Bank Indi-
cators. I follow the authors’ analysis combined with the approach used
by Accemoglu et al. (2001) investigating the colonial origins of compar-
ative development.
I construct a panel dataset over the years 1989-2008 for the 29 tran-
sition countries The cutoff year allows me to account for results not af-
fected by the subsequent financial crisis.
The focus of the analysis investigating the persistence of historical
legacies focuses especially on the following countries: Albania, Bosnia
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Serbia. I use the former Soviet Union
countries as a control while trying to increase the power of the estima-
tions.
All of these countries were under communist governments, but only
some of them were actually incorporated into the Soviet Union. Thus,
the former Soviet Union countries shared a more homogeneous history.
This homogeneity means that different attitudes toward bribery reflect
something other than Soviet-era history. Similarly, the nations that once
formed Yugoslavia were a single country for most of the 20th century, yet
still exhibit differences based on their relationship to the Karlowitz line.
This region, even though shaped by continuous wars between Empires,
clearly claims an impact of two main different legacies: the Ottoman
Empire and what is here defined as the combined Austro Hungarian-
Prussian legacy.
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I use an Instrumental Variable approach following the path depen-
dence legacy on shaping institutions and arguing that the time spent
under a specific Empire captures the exogenous component of institu-
tions and with the exclusion restriction that history affects growth only
through the institutional channel.
Furthermore the main interest is on the role of Ottoman legacy being
the dominant power for centuries in the South Eastern European region.
In this part of the analysis I use country level data on GDPpc from the
World Bank Indicators, World Governance indicators for the institutional
variables, covariates used in the transition literature as well as Magocsi
Historical Altlas of East Central Europe and other historical literature for
the construction of the Instrumental Variable.
It is recognized that the Kaufaman et al governance indicators have
their limits, but what is interesting for this part of the study is that they
allow the capture of the first inclusive aspect of informal institutions into
the formal ones. These indicators are highly correlated with each other.
While in the second part this study focus mainly on attitudes towards
corruption, data and channels of persistence, for this part all the WGI
are taken into account as they capture different aspects of the corruption,
(especially at administrative level) intended as formal and informal in-
stitutions. Summary statistics demonstrate that the indexes with higher
values correspond to better institutional performance (i.e. lower levels of
i.e. corruption) (to be discussed) (Appendix to be added for the WGI..)
Instrumental variable: Weighted index for the length of Empire occu-
pation
Following Dimitrova Grajzl’s (2007) approach I proxy the impact of the
historical legacy by the duration of the Empire hypothesing that the more
time a country has spent under the rule of a certain empire the stronger
the influence of that empire’s culture and institutions is on the country’s
current culture and institutions
In this study, I try to use an approach closer to that of economic his-
tory in order to use historical legacies to predict economic outcomes. I
used meticulous research of the specific dates of ‘durations of the rule’
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of the ‘effective legacy in place’. As an example: Transylvania during
the years of Ottoman occupancy continued to be ruled by Hungarian
princes, at the same time as, as is argued in the historical literature, the
Prussian nobility maintained their privileged power over administrative
matters in Estonia and Latvia during the first years of Russian imperial
rule. To construct Instrumental Variables, I create a weighted index that
accounts for the length of a country’s legacy counting the period between
the beginning of the fifteenth century and the country’s proclaimed in-
dependence (period 1400-1918). I also take into account that different
countries have been ruled by different Empires in different phases dur-
ing the period as defined. As argued by historians and Dimitrova-Grajzl
(2007), the latest centuries should have a more relevant impact of cultural
and institutional persistence. The year 1989 is used here as a reference
ending year as the year that marks the end of the communist period, the
start of the market oriented institutional reforms, and the start year for
the dataset used in this study. The ‘importance’ assigned to each year is
equal to the inverse of the distance between 1989 and the year itself. The
use of this reference year yields a convenient shape to the importance of
the function. The shape is similar to an exponential function, for which
we observe a significant increase in importance for years after 1700. This
better represents the importance of the governance administrative trans-
formations in the biggest two empires Ottoman and Habsbourg after the
beginning of the seventeenth century. The construction of the index is as
follows:
Country ”s weight of a certain empire is:
tin∑
j=ti0
1/(1989− j)
where ti0 is the first year when the empire’s occupation of countryi
started at tin is the year when the empire’s occupation (or effective ruler
supremacy) of countryi ended. I compute indices for each country and
each empire by adding the value of each year when the country was
under occupation by that empire. As previously mentioned the years
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closer to the present are assumed to be more important than earlier years.
The relative weight of each year under the occupation of an Empire
is graphically represented in Figure 2.
The main focus of this study is the legacy of Ottoman Empire in South
Eastern Europe (specifically the Balkan region) and the consequent im-
pact on present day institutions in the region. Indexes nevertheless are
created for the four main legacies evidenced in the literature: Ottoman,
Austro-Hungarian (Habsbourg), Prussian, Russian. The Prussian index,
named Pru-PL also refers to the Poland-Lithuanian commonwealth. Ac-
counting for all the four legacies helps interpreting the main correlation
findings between these one and the institutional variables. Descriptive
statistics for these indices are presented in Table 1.
IV discussion
The duration of the Imperial occupation doesn’t vary over time for the
countries considered therefore the Panel dataset of 20 years data is con-
verted to a Poled OLS. The estimated model is the following
log(Gdppc) = β0 + β1Instindex+  (1.1)
where the institutional variable is assumed to affect growth through
different channels being correlated with unobserved variable, namely in-
cluded in the error term. The OLS estimations will therefore be biased
and inconsistent. The instrument length of historical legacy (empire oc-
cupation) is assumed to be correlated with the indexes of institutional
quality but not with other omitted variables that might affect growth.
The exclusion restriction being that the IV affects growth only
through the channel of institutions that by construction include the infor-
mal ones and therefore as a second validity assumption are uncorrelated
with the error term in the first equation.
The first assumption of the IV being correlated with the institutional
index Cov(Instindex,Histweight) 6= 0 is tested with the reduced form
equation alias the first stage with the following second equation
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Instindex = α0 + α1Histweight+ u (1.2)
where as from Table 4 the H0 : α0 = 0 is rejected.
Constrained by the small sample, and motivated by an interest specif-
ically for the effect of the Ottoman legacy on the South Eastern region of
Eastern Europe, only the Ottoman weight is used as an instrument. The
size and significance of the Ottoman weight does not change when the
other historical weighted variables are included. The same findings ap-
ply to the second stage, even when control variables are added.
Assuming the IV being uncorrelated with the error termCov(Histweight, ) =
0 therefore lead to
Cov[log(Gdppc), Histweight] = β1Cov(Instindex,Histweight)
+Cov(e,Histweight) (1.3)
and the estimate of β1 being βˆ1
βˆ1 =
Cov[log(Gdppc), Histweight]
Cov(Instindex,Histweight)
(1.4)
The reduced form, the first stage and the instrumented results are
represented in Figure 3.
The instrument is negatively correlated with the dependent variable
and the instrumented variable. As from the construction of the index
lower values of the WGI institutional index indicate lower institutional
quality (performance), therefore an increase in the length of the Ottoman
occupation decreased the institutional quality i.e. corruption and rule
of law. The WGI institutional index once instrumented is highly and
negatively correlated with the log of GDP per capita as it decreases with
lower values of the institutional index.
Nevertheless in the case on an IV analysis the R2 cannot be in-
terpreted as the percentage of the variation explained. Other valid-
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ity tests are thus taken into consideration. Asymptotic properties of
IV(consistency, normality) indicates an analysis of the F statistics on the
first-stage to be useful testing for a weak instrument. In both first stage
analyses the F-statistic is larger than 30 (First stage results clustered by
country). Furthermore a Wu- Hausman test is performed to test for en-
dogeneity and the validity of the IV test versus OLS. Without endogene-
ity, both OLS and IV are consistent, but IV is inefficient. The Hausman
test in this case indicates the OLS to be an inconsistent estimator for this
equation, and the IV should therefore be preferred.
This analysis aims to test the importance of institutions for growth,
and indicates therefore a different exogenous component of the different
institutional (formal and informal) channel then those used in the previ-
ous literature. Given the uneasiness that often accompanies an IV anal-
ysis, the exclusionary restriction is addressed more in the next sections
where the channel of the persistence of historical legacies is identified
through the historical narrative and addressed with a household level
analysis
1.5.2 Regression discontinuity analysis
Regression discontinuity analysis was first introduced by Thistlethwaite
and Campbell in 1960 and in the late 1990s started being used more
widely in economics. The basic idea behind the RD design is that as-
signment to the treatment is determined, either completely or partly, by
the value of a predictor being on either side of a threshold (Imbens and
Lemieux 2008)
I use Geografic Information System to georeference the household
from the LITS household survey. Therefore the historical Karlovitz bor-
der is used as an identification strategy for a comparing the ‘treatment
effect’ of the Ottoman legacy in the region with that of the Austro-
Hungarian and Prussian former empire. The analysis focuses on the in-
teraction of households with local bureaucrats on both sides of the no
longer existent border and their propensity to bribe.
By overlapping today’s map of Europe and the one of 1699, I recon-
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struct a hypothetical division of countries on one side and the other of
the border defined by the former Karlowitz treaty. I use the geo informa-
tion on latitude and longitude of households to calculate the Euclidian
distance in space from the border therefore translated into kilometers.
Both parametric functional form (say, a low-order polynomial) and
a non-parametric procedure such as local linear regression “running a
regression using only data points “close” to the cutoff “ can in differ-
ent cases lead to biased outcomes and in practice, parametric and non-
parametric approaches lead to the computation of the exact same statis-
tic. (Lee and Lemieux 2009). The procedure of regressing the outcome
Y on a treatment dummy B as in this case can be interpreted as a para-
metric or as a (non parametric) local linear regression with a very large
bandwidth.
Following Dell’s (2010) interpretation I define this RD as a semipara-
metric analysis being a regression discontinuity approach with outcomes
geographically defined (in latitude and longitude).
The first estimated regression is the following
yi,c = φc + αBi,c + i,c (1.5)
with i=1, ..., N as the household index, c=1, ..., C countries index, yi,c
index the “outcome variable” from the LITS survey for household i in
country c related to the propensity to bribe and αi,c the country-specific
fixed effect. Bi,c being the ‘border’ indicator, equal to 1 if the observation
lies in an area ruled by the former Ottoman empire and 0 otherwise.
In order to test the Karlowitz division effect and control for a disconti-
nuity at the border (i.e. Ottoman/AHP Border/) I avail of GIS construct-
ing a variable di,c that accounts for the geographical distance between
household i and the Karlowitz border and recode it as follows
Di,c =
{
−di,c if i lies in the former Ottoman region
di,c if i lies in the former Austro-Hungary Prussian region
(1.6)
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Therefore households that today live in the areas formerly ruled by
the Ottomans after the treaty of Karlowitz will be on the ‘negative dis-
tance’ side of the border and the individuals that live in the areas for-
merly ruled by the Austro-Hungarians and the Prussians. The value at 0
is the threshold of discontinuity. After reclassifying the variable the RD
regression takes the following form
yi,c = φc + f(Di,c) + i,c (1.7)
where f(.) is a flexible function estimated semi-parametrically or ap-
proximated by a polynomial or a series of regressions:
yi,c = φc + α1Bi,c + α2B
2
i,c + α3B
3
i,c + α4B
4
i,c + i,c (1.8)
Representing this graphically I assign each of observations to specific
“distance-bins” and record the mean outcome for each distance bin. I
plot those bin averages on the y-axis, and the distance for those bins on
the x-axis The point at x = 0 is the discontinuity point and as from Fig 5.
1.6 Results
Results in the following section are divided in cross country evidence
and Household Ordered Logit Regression Discontinuity analysis. A last
section describes results obtained using consumption index and light in-
tensity data as proxy for growth at the Karlowitz border.
1.6.1 Cross Country Evidence
Because there is a high degree of correlation among the World Gover-
nance Indicators, corruption and rule of law are used as representative
of all WGI in the above discussed graphical part of the analysis (Fig-
ure 3). Table 2 shows the correlation between indexes of historical lega-
cies and those of institutional quality. The Ottoman weight is the only
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one negatively correlated with the index of institutions. This relation-
ship is used as the first stage regression of the index of corruption (or
rule of law) on the weighted variable for the Ottoman persistence in Fig-
ure 5. Linear regressions of the institutional quality represented by the
corruption index show the Ottoman legacy, proxied by a dummy or by
the weighted variable, to enter the regression with a negative sign in all
cases. (Table 3) Control variables, added as suggested in the literature,
reduce the power of the coefficients and in some cases (column 5, 7 and
9) also the explanatory power of the model. EU accession and initial con-
ditions at the beginning of the communist period are shown to have a
positive effect in reducing corruption, thus increasing institutional qual-
ity. Interestingly, controlling for the average index of reforms, in the case
of the ottoman dummy variable, reduces the power of the model (col-
umn 5) but not the size of the coefficient. All variables used to capture
the Ottoman legacy are significant at 1% . While these results don’t aim
to express causality, it is interesting to focus on the magnitude of the co-
efficient of the historical legacy. The proxy for the historical legacy of
the Ottoman Empire is captured in Table 4, first stage IV. A country that
spent 500 hundred years under the Ottoman Empire (as in the case of
Macedonia weighted value 2.05) experiences an increase of the corrup-
tion index of almost 1.08 points compared to a country (like Slovenia)
that spent zero years under the same Empire. Interestingly respective
indexes of corruption in 2008 are -.110 for Macedonia and .951 for Slove-
nia. Given that the weighted index is not defined linearly and it gives
an (subjectively) increasing weight to the more recent years, it is difficult
to interpret differences among countries that spent certain periods under
Ottoman rule. It is of interest however to interpret the results with the
case of another country, Croatia, that spent almost 150 years before the
Karlowitz treaty (1699) under the Ottoman Empire. The legacy of the
imperial legacy on the institution index in this case is only - 0.242 points.
Table 4 also presents the second stage results of the IV of the effect
of the different institutional indicators on growth expressed in GDP per
capita. All coefficients are significant at 1%. Given that the dependent
variable is the log of the percentage change in GDP per capita, for a one
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unit increase in the corruption index the growth of GDP per capita will
increase by 100 times the coefficient. The robustness check (Table 5) with
additional variables added at the first stage and the second stage of the
IV shows that institution coefficients do not vary significantly. In or-
der to capture the effect of the time spent under the Ottoman Empire on
growth through the institution channel, I compare three countries with
different lengths of the Ottoman occupation: i.e. Macedonia (1400-1878)
weighted index 2.055, Bulgaria (1400-1878) weighted index 1.674, Bosnia
and Herzegovina (1472-1878) weighted index 1.534. Multiplying the dif-
ference between two pair of indexes (first Bulgaria and Macedonia) with
the first stage results and then repeating the operation for the second
stage results in the case of the index of corruption the estimated effect
will be that of an increase of points 17 of GDP per capita for the country
with the shorter Ottoman legacy. While repeating the analysis compar-
ing Bulgaria and Bosnia Herzegovina we notice a lower weight of this
difference compared to the previous one. This reflects the structure of
the construction of the weighted variable as an index of historical length
(legacy) giving more weight to the occupation of the latest years. In this
case we will have an increased effect of reduced corruption on GDP per
capita of 6 points for the country that has been occupied three quarters
of a century later.
1.6.2 Household level Regression Discontinuity findings
Results from table 7, 8, and 9 are interpreted in terms of log-odds ratios
being the categorical outcome variable. The analysis is performed for
different bandwidths from 200 km (124 miles) to 50 km (31 miles) and
different polynomial approximations. Table 7 provides evidence when
accounting for all CEE Countries in the accounted radius from the bor-
der. Table 8 when the analysis is repeated only for Bosnia Herzegovina,
Croatia, Romania, Serbia, and Table 9 shows results from the only within
country variation in Romania. In the latter case, due to the lack of obser-
vations only Linear interacted polynomial 100 km and 200km from the
border is performed. Coefficients show that the probability of bribing
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increases discontinuously at the border when crossing to the Ottoman
side and are interpreted as a percentage increase in the log odds ratio.
This means that if the household interview is on the Ottoman side of the
border (Ottoman dummy=1), ceteris paribus, there is an increase on the
exponential of the log of the ratios, namely a factor ecoef , on the proba-
bility of being in a higher category of bribing. For most of the coefficients
the propensity increases closer to the border. The analysis shows similar
results in the three above cited cases.
I consider the question “In your opinion, how often is it necessary for
people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situ-
ations in the case of Interacting with the road police”. In table 7 consid-
ering Interacted Linear Polynomial the probability of being in a higher
category (willingness to bribe from 1 Never to 5 Always) increases by
a factor of 2.48 if 200km from the Ottoman border and 2.88 if only 50
km distant. In Table 8 those figures became 2.627 and 2.36 respectively.
A robustness check is performed with a cubic polynomial interaction.
Further controls with additional variables as latitude and longitude, ed-
ucation, work status, and age do not change the sign and significance of
coefficients in most cases. While the effects can furthermore be identi-
fied computing marginal fixed effects it is important to emphasize that
the aim of this model is to provide the causal test rather than accurate
predictions in magnitudes.
1.6.3 Consumption index and light intensity data as
proxy for growth at the border level
In the last part of the analysis consumption and light intensity data are
used to test for growth divergence on both sides of the Karlowitz border.
Henderson Storeygard and Weil (2009) introduce the use of intensity of
night lights, captured from the US Air Force weather satellites as a proxy
for economic growth.
The results are mixed but still showing a decrease of consumption
and light intensity closer to the Ottoman side especially when consid-
ering the analysis within Romania in the last part of the analysis con-
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sumption and light intensity data are used to test for growth divergence
on both sides of the Karlowitz border. Henderson Storeygard and Weil
(2009) introduce the use of intensity of night lights, captured from the US
Air Force weather satellites as a proxy for economic growth.
The results are mixed but still showing a decrease of consumption
and light intensity closer to the Ottoman side especially when consider-
ing the analysis within Romania.
1.7 Conclusions
This study sheds light on the importance of long term historical legacies
on institutional divergence in terms of governance (country level and lo-
cal level) in Central Eastern Europe and the subsequent effect on growth
with a specific focus on the main legacy of the Ottoman Empire in South
Eastern Europe. The analysis shows the Ottoman imprint (measured ac-
cording to the duration of the Empire) to be negatively correlated with
institutions in the region. This exogenous component of institutions thus
has a negative impact on growth in GDP per capita. At the household
level a focus on local governance and focusing on the former institutional
change on the Ottoman tax system shows the countries once under the
Ottoman Empire are more willing to bribe and thus distrust local offi-
cials. The analysis provides evidence that this effect can be linked with
the long past shared faith over centuries in these countries. Results con-
firm previous findings in the literature.
Social scientists from different disciplines consider corruption to in-
crease transaction costs especially for the transitional economies, and ar-
gue the propensity to bribe local officials and thus distrust of government
leads to generalized distrust of people more generally. Generalized trust
itself is known to be inimical to economic development. Further work
in progress uses social network data as a proxy for trust to analyze the
imprint of historical legacies on this other institutional aspect.
32
Table 1: Summary Statistics. Weighted variables and Institutional Variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Ottoman weight 16 0.736275 0.769885 0 2.055135
Hapsburgs weight 16 0.640799 0.894256 0 2.123653
Pru-PL weight 16 0.243439 0.510708 0 1.40234
Russian weight 16 0.141376 0.260041 0 0.959627
Corruption index 153 0.084694 0.531435 -1.09887 1.09945
Rule of law index 153 0.127968 0.606699 -1.26626 1.10811
Regol. Quality index 153 0.4812 0.62405 -1.27928 1.49331
Gov. Effectivness index 153 0.253552 0.614194 -1.25979 1.16288
Political Stability index 153 0.249535 0.664944 -1.9349 1.20062
Voice and Account. index 153 0.553881 0.525435 -1.38198 1.21826
LogGDPpc 301 9.136845 0.486035 7.109819 10.21031
Countries Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Chezc Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia; Serbia. Pru-PL accounts for Prussia and
Poland-Lithuanian commonwealth. They are jointly accounted a single legacy
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Table 4: Corruption index from World Governance indicators and Empire
Index
FIRST STAGE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
corruptest rulawest voiceest polstabest goveffest regqest
Ottoman Index -528*** -.643*** -.532*** -.670*** -.651*** -.619***
(.034) (.034) (.029) (.043) (.037) (.040)
SECOND STAGE
LogGDPpc
corruptest .893***
(.057)
rulawest .733***
(.043))
voiceest .885***
(.052)
polstabest .703***
(.051)
goveffest .724***
(.035)
regqest .762***
(.051)
Constant 9.193*** 9.175*** 8.778*** 9.093*** 9.085*** 8.902***
(.024) (.023) (.035) (.032) (.019) (.033)
Adj. R2 .632 .653 .559 .544 .781 .515
Number 16 16 16 16 16 16
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Corruption index from World Governance indicators and Empire
Index
FIRST STAGE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
corruptest rulawest voiceest polstabest goveffest regqest
Ottoman Index -.595*** -.682*** -.543*** -.679*** -.652*** -.574***
(.039) (.041) (.034) (.047) (.040) (.043)
SECOND STAGE
LogGDPpc
corruptest .847***
(.053)
rulawest .732***
(.043)
voiceest .927***
(.050)
polstabest .742***
(.048)
goveffest .772***
(.037)
regqest .878***
(.055)
L.dmelo89 .135 .450*** .134 .859*** .522*** 1.162***
(.119) (.125) (.135) (.133) (.098) (.167)
L.govexp .011** .005 .011* .011** .003 .006
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.006)
ansplan -.019*** -.013** -.010 -.007 -.017*** -.030***
(.006) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.005) (.006)
Constant 9.863*** 9.595*** 8.878*** .306 9.678*** 9.854***
(.272) (.261) (.321) (.048) (.233) (.294)
Adj. R2 .682 .700 .619 .621 .796 .647
Number 16 16 16 16 16 16
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics Household Analysis
Ottoman Non Ottoman
Unofficial Payments For 200km (124 miles) Obs. Mean Obs Mean
Interact with the road police 6161 1.850 2856 1.442
Request official documents 6165 1.765 2856 1.327
Interact with the police on other matters 6153 1.586 2854 1.253
Go to courts for a civil matter 6153 1.693 2848 1.315
Receive medical treatment in the public health system 6153 2.395 2851 1.960
Receive public education (university, college, vocation 6156 1.740 2857 1.219
Request unemployment benefits 6155 1.547 2852 1.493
Request other social security benefits 6144 1.565 2855 1.236
Unofficial Payments Interacting with the road Police
100 km (62 miles) 4145 1.843 1338 1.426
75 km (46.6 miles) 3465 1.853 1138 1.408
50km (31 miles) 2406 1.816 940 1.401
20km (12.4 miles) 278 1.92 80 1.5
10km (6miles) 949 1.988 281 1.444
Age of selected respondents (A and B)
Resp A - 200 km (124miles) 2502 51.4 742 52.4
Resp B - 200 km (124miles) 6179 45.8 2862 50.7
Resp A - 100 km (62 miles) 1756 51.0 389 52.4
Resp B - 100 km (62 miles) 4159 44.4 1340 50.4
10km (6miles) 949 1.988 281 1.444
Education -highest degree
Education - 200 km (124miles) 6176 3.212 2860 3.32
Education - 100 km (62miles) 4157 3.210 1339 3.33
Education - 75km (46.6 miles) 3477 3.17 1139 3.36
Education - 50km (31 miles) 2417 3.13 939 3.46
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Figure 1: Karlowitz Border (1699) Reconstructed on the present day Map of
Europe (Authors relaboration of Euroatlas data)
Figure 2: Graphical representation of the Historical legacy index (IV)
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Figure 3: Correlation Log GDPpc and the Instrumented WG Index of Cor-
ruption
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Figure 4: Propensity of Unofficial Payments/Gifts
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Figure 5: Total Light Intensity index per Country
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Figure 6: Romania Light Intensity
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Figure 7: Karlowitz Treaty - 1699 Newspaper
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Chapter 2
Uncertainty, Informational
Spillovers and Policy
Reform: A Gravity Model
Approach
2.1 Introduction
Political and economic changes tend to occur in waves, in a pattern often
described as the domino effect: changes initiated in one country spread
to other countries. Examples of this phenomenon in the political domain
include the events of 1848 in Europe, emergence of new independent
countries from the ruins of the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires in the
late 19th and early 20th century, decolonization following the end of the
2nd World War, democratizations in Latin America in the late 1980s and
in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, and most recently the Arab Spring
in the Middle East and the Occupy movement in Western countries. On
the economic front, we can observe similar waves, such as the liberaliza-
tion and privatization waves during the late 1980s and throughout the
1990s. Reform waves can be observed also with respect to less dramatic
changes. The ban on smoking in restaurants and bars, adopted first in
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Ireland has since spread to most European countries. Eastern Europe,
on the other hand, has experienced similar legislative spillovers with re-
spect to the adoption of the flat tax, first introduced in Estonia in 1994.1
We argue that reform waves such as the preceding examples spread
because they are aided by informational spillovers. The outcome of a re-
form is inherently uncertain. Reversing an already-implemented reform,
furthermore, is costly. Uncertainty about reform outcome combined with
costly reversal may cause efficiency-enhancing reforms to be postponed
or not implemented at all: a phenomenon referred to as the status-quo
bias (see Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991, and Alesina and Drazen, 1991).
Individuals, however, can infer important signals about the likely out-
come of the reform by observing the outcomes similar reform produced
elsewhere. If the reform turns out to have positive repercussions in one
country, other countries become more likely to implement the same re-
form; a negative outcome in one country can stop the reform in its track
in other countries too.
To illustrate how this phenomenon might work, we formulate a sim-
ple theoretical model of political economy of reform with inter-country
informational spillovers. If informational spillovers are important, we
would expect nearby countries to be affected more strongly than distant
ones. Similarly, events in countries that share cultural, political or histor-
ical similarities are likely to bear more weight than events in relatively
dissimilar countries.
The model yields testable predictions which we then subject to an
empirical analysis. We look at the post-communist transitions in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (with our data spanning the period until the
onset of the recent economic and financial crisis, i.e. 1990-2008). We
consider the post-communist countries because of two reasons: (1) the
vast majority of them at least attempted economic and political reforms
during the period in question, and (2) this group of countries displayed
a great deal of variation in the depth and outcomes of reforms imple-
1In both cases, the innovation originated outside Europe.The smoking banwas intro-
duced in various US jurisdictions about a decade before its introduction in Ireland. Hong
Kong, similarly, has had a flat tax for decades before its adoption in Estonia.
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mented.While much of the literature on the relationship between reforms
and uncertainty has been written with economic reforms in mind, we ex-
pect spillovers to apply to political and economic reforms alike. We thus
measure reforms using indexes of democratization and economic liber-
alization. Our findings strongly suggest that informational spillovers in-
deed played a role in facilitating economic and political changes in these
countries. The spillovers with respect to the latter appear particularly
prominent.
In the next section, we discuss the related literature on the role of
uncertainty in determining the success of reforms and on spillovers or
contagion effects in reforms. In section 3, we formulate a simple model
of informational spillovers in reforms. We discuss the data in section 4,
section 5 presents our methodology and section 6 presents our empirical
findings. The last section then outlines our main conclusions.
2.2 Related Literature
The relationship between uncertainty and reform success has been ex-
plored extensively in the literature motivated by the reforms (and their
failures) in Latin America and Easter Europe during the 1980s and 1990s.
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) coined the term status-quo bias to describe
situations when countries fail to implement reforms that are expected to
increase overall welfare. They argue that this is due to uncertainty about
the distribution of costs and benefits of the reform. In particular, it is
possible that a reform that benefits the majority of the population ex post
is nonetheless rejected ex ante. This can happen if (some) voters expect
their payoff from implementing the reform to be negative. Alesina and
Drazen (1991), similarly show that uncertainty about the distribution of
benefits and costs of reforms can lead to inefficient delays due to war
of attrition. Dewatripont and Roland (1992 a,b; 1995) consider aggre-
gate rather than individual uncertainty. They point out that that under
uncertainty, reforms implemented gradually rather than in a big-bang
fashion are more likely to succeed because their gradual implementation
partially resolves the underlying uncertainty about their eventual out-
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come. If reform reversal is costly, gradual reform thus allows the voters
to receive a signal about the outcome of the full reform. Depending on
the signal, they can either implement the full reform or reverse the initial
reform to return to the status quo. Doing so helps avoid reversing the
full reform, which is assumed to be more costly than reversing a partial
reform.
The preceding contributions consider reforms in one country in iso-
lation of what might be going on elsewhere. Yet, the notion that reforms
in one country can affect reforms elsewhere is not new. This process
has been denoted, variously, as snowballing (Brezis and Verdier, 2003),
contagion (Gassebner, Gaston and Lamla, 2008, and Campos and Hor-
vath, 2006) and learning (Meseguer, 2006). The unifying feature of this
literature, however, is that it considers primarily the spread of economic
reform and ignores the similar waves of political liberalization. A par-
tial exception is the model by Brezis and Verdier (2003) who argue that
democratization in a neighboring country makes it easier for repressed
citizens to emigrate. That, in turn, reduces the ability of the dictator to
repress protest and makes political liberalization there more likely too,
thus opening the way for economic reform.
Gassebner et al. (2011) propose a theoretical model of reform
spillovers. They consider ‘contagion of reforms2 because of inter-
jurisdictional competition due to factor mobility as well as because of
trade between countries, and argue that the former is more likely to play
a role.3 They then proceed to test their model using data on a broad panel
of countries, with reform measured by the index of economic freedom
(Heritage Foundation). They find that economic reforms in other coun-
tries are indeed important determinants of reform progress elsewhere
and that these spillovers are better facilitated by geographic and cultural
proximity than by trade.
Meseguer (2006) formulates a model in which policy makers use the
experience of other countries to update their expectations on the outcome
2Campos and Horvath (2006) also consider ‘contagion of reform.
3In a related paper, Faber and Gerritse (2012) consider the impact of trade and invest-
ment flows on institutional quality.
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of reform in their own country through a process of Bayesian learning.
She then tests her model empirically, with reform outcomes measured
as having an independent central bank, liberal trade regime, agreement
with the IMF and engaging in privatization.4 She finds evidence of learn-
ing in three out of the four policy areas, the exception being central
bank independence. The analysis, however, is somewhat ad-hoc: some
variables of interest are defined as policies while others capture policy
changes. Having an independent central bank and liberal trade regime
are examples of the former while engaging in privatization (rather than
having most productive assets in private ownership) is the latter. Hav-
ing an agreement with the IMF, furthermore, does not necessarily capture
reform but may reflect the underlying economic hardship that compels
countries to seek assistance from the IMF.
In the remainder of the paper, we develop a simple theoretical mo-
del of informational spillovers and their impact on reforms under uncer-
tainty. We argue that this mechanism can be at work for economic and
political reforms alike. We then test this model empirically on a sample
of post-communist countries undertaking both kinds of reforms.
2.3 Model of Reform, Uncertainly and Informa-
tional Spillovers
The fundamental problem of implementing political or economic reform
is that their outcome is inherently uncertain. Attempts at political change
may lead to democracy and rule of law but they can also degenerate
into political instability, infighting or open political or even military con-
flict.For example, consider two countries that experienced transition to
democracy in 1989-90: Poland and Romania.Both started with broadly
based popular protests and both ended up with their countries imple-
menting wide-ranging democratization and eventually jointing the EU.
The initial trajectory and the economic and human cost associated with it
4Brueckner(2000), analyzing welfare reform, argues that the level of benefit provision
in neighboring states affects policymakers decision on the generosity of the welfare state.
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were dramatically different: while in Poland the protests lead to a round-
table negotiation between the communist government and the opposi-
tion, the Romanian government sought to suppress the protest by calling
in the police and later also the army.Similarly, the Tunisian and Libyan
protests in 2010-11 both eventually lead to the falls of the incumbent
regimes but at dramatically different costs. Economic reform, likewise,
can bring about economic growth and rising living standards or it can
give rise to unemployment and run-away inflation. The contrast, for ex-
ample, between the outcomes of economic reforms in Russia and China,
is especially poignant.
The role of uncertainty about reforms and their outcomes has been
well recognized in the early transition literature (see in particular Fer-
nandez and Rodrik, 1991; and Dewatripont and Roland, 1992a,b and
1995). Uncertainty about the outcome of the reform (or its distributional
implications) can lead to it being inefficiently postponed or abandoned
altogether. Reducing the uncertainty therefore can bethe key to the suc-
cessful implementation of the reform. Dewatripont and Roland(1992a,b)
show that a gradual reform is associated with partial resolution of uncer-
tainty about the outcome of the full reform. In their framework, a partial
reform is never optimal alone but the cost of reversing it is lower than
that of reversing the full reform. By implementing the partial reform first,
the voters obtain a signal about the outcome of the full reform. With this
signal, and with the resulting reduction in uncertainty, they can make a
better informed choice whether to continue with the remaining reform
measures or reverse those already implemented.
We formulate a simple three-period model which builds on Dewa-
tripont and Rolandwith a crucial difference: in our framework, the reso-
lution of uncertainty comes from observing the experience of other coun-
tries. In the two examples at the beginning of this section, the reform
waves started in Poland and Tunisia, respectively, and in both cases pro-
ceeded relatively smoothly (certainly when compared to the subsequent
events in Romania and Libya). Had the order been reversed and the ini-
tial country experienced a great deal of bloodshed, it is very well possible
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that no reform wave would have followed.5
Consider country iwith a continuum of risk-averse voters. The voters
can be heterogeneous but we only consider uncertainty about aggregate
outcomes (i.e. those common for all voters). The status quo is associ-
ated with a negative payoff that accrues to all voters; the period value of
that payoff is −γi. This disutility can stem either from economic policies
or political repression in the status quo: excessive state interference in
the economy, distortionary taxes, tolerance of smoking in public places
or disregard for political rights of individuals. The status quo can be
amended by implementing a reform; the outcome of that reform, how-
ever, is uncertain, and may even be worse than the status quo. Based on
the information available before the reform, the voters can form expecta-
tions about the period value of the reforms outcome. Let E(ωi|Ii be the
expected value of the future payoff, γi, conditional on the information
available at present, Ii. For simplicity, we assume that the same payoff
will accrue in every period after the implementation of the reform, un-
less the reform is reversed. If the outcome of the reform is worse than
the status quo, the reform can be reversed in the third period; reversal
is associated with cost −ξi and the decision whether to maintain the re-
form or reverse it is taken at the end of the first period, after the payoff
is revealed (and incurred). If the reform is reversed, the reversal cost is
incurred and thereafter the status-quo payoff is again restored. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the status quo payoff and reversal costs are not
uncertain.
Assuming no informational spillovers (autarky), the return from im-
plementing the reform will be
E(ωi|Ii) + δE(ωi|Ii) + δ2E(ωi|Ii) (2.1)
in case the reform is maintained, and
5Similarly, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia
in 1968, both of which were crushed by Soviet invasions, did not set off waves of similar
events elsewhere.
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E(ωi|Ii)− δξi − δ2γi (2.2)
if it is reversed. The payoffs that accrue during the second and third
periods are discounted by discount factor δ.
The reform therefore will be implemented if
E(ωi|Ii) > γi (2.3)
where Ii is stands for all the information available to the voters in
country i during the first period. The reform will be maintained if
ωi + δωi > −ξi − δγi (2.4)
Note that the decision whether to maintain or reverse the reform is
based on the actual outcome, revealed once the reform has been imple-
mented, rather than its expectation.
Now we consider the case with informational spillovers. We assume
the outcomes of reforms implemented elsewhere can be observed only
with a lag. Therefore, voters in country i have an additional option: to
postpone implementing the reform in order to observe its outcome in
countries that have already implemented it. In that case, the information
set available to voters in country i is [Ω, X]. Ω is the vector of actual out-
comes in the other countries, ω1, ..., ωn while X is a vector of parameters
χ1, ..., χn depicting how similar the conditions in the various other coun-
tries are to the conditions in country i. This strategy therefore yields the
payoff
−γi + δE(ωi|Ω, X) + δ2E(ωi|Ω, X) (2.5)
in case the reform is maintained and
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−γi + δE(ωi|Ω, X)− δ2ξi (2.6)
if it is reversed. The conditions for maintaining or reversing the re-
form are similar as before except that now this decision takes place at the
end of the second period rather than the first period.
Postponing the reform is costly: it results in the negative status-quo
payoff being incurred for one additional period: this is captured by the
first term in the payoff functions (5) and (6). The cost of doing so, how-
ever, may be outweighed by the benefit of improving the precision of
the voters’ expectations of the reform’s outcome in the next two periods.
If the informational spillovers from the other countries are significant,
then this helps avoid the potential additional cost of having to reverse a
reform whose outcome is worse than the status quo.
This result is similar to that of Dewatripont and Roland (1992a,b) who
argue that gradual reform helps reduce uncertainty about the reform out-
come. In this case, the reduction of uncertainty stems not from the reform
being implemented gradually but from postponing it and learning from
the experience of others. Once the outcomes of reforms implemented
elsewhere are observed, the reform can still be implemented in a big bag
fashion. On the other hand, if the cost of maintaining the status quo is
very high, then this strategy may not be optimal.
Informational spillovers such as those discussed in the model above
are likely to be one reason for political or economic changes occurring in
waves, as was the case in the post-communist countries during 1989-91
or in the Middle East during 2011. For example, the decision of Pol-
ish and Hungarian communist governments not to suppress popular
protests and then to engage in negotiations with the opposition in spring
and summer of 1989 was likely to have been instrumental in encourag-
ing the subsequent protests in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in fall
of that year. Had either government chosen to crack down on the protests
as later happened in Romania, the enthusiasm for political change may
well have waned throughout the region. Similarly, the positive outcome
and relatively low cost of political change in Tunisia in spring of 2011 is
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likely to have encouraged similar protests throughout the Middle East.
It is also not surprising that the remaining authoritarian regimes, such
as North Korea and China, seek to suppress the spread of information
about the on-going changes in the Middle East.6
On the economic front, the countries that initiated reforms relatively
late benefited from learning from the experience of Poland and Hungary
whose reforms were initiated in 1990. The (predominantly negative) ex-
perience with partial economic reforms in the former Yugoslavia in the
course of the 1980s also could have had informational value: it may have
contributed to the decision of the subsequent reformers to shy away from
piecemeal reform.
Last but not least, the experience of other countries can help also with
respect to selecting the toolkit for facilitating change. The reliance on text
messages and social networks to organize political protests in Iran in the
wake of the 2009 election was replicated throughout the Middle East in
2011 and is likely to have contributed to the success of those movements.7
Economic reforms such as the voucher privatization during the early to
mid 1990s, pension reform in mid to late 1990s or the introduction of the
flat tax in the 2000s also proceeded in waves.
We therefore hypothesize, in line with our model, that the progress
in political or economic reform should be related to spillover effects em-
anating from the stock of previous reforms implemented elsewhere, cor-
responding to the vector Ω. The intensity of informational spillovers,
furthermore, is also likely to depend on the extent of similarity between
the two countries, as captured by vector X in our model. In other words,
6The government of North Korea was reported to have banned its citizens who worked
in Libya under the Qaddafi regime from returning (see “North Korea bans citizens work-
ing in Libya from returning home,” The Telegraph, 27 October 2011. China regularly sup-
presses news about popular protests in its media, regardless of whether those protests take
place in China or elsewhere. Websites such as Facebook and Twitter, which helped coor-
dinate protest in the Middle East and elsewhere, have been blocked in China. Finally, it is
particularly instructive to compare the results of searching for keywords such as ‘Jasmine
revolution’ on google.com and baidu.com: the two alternative search engines produce dra-
matically different lists of entries.
7The Chinese government has learned this lesson too. During the 2009 unrest in Xin-
jiang, mobile-phone and internet services remained suspended for extended periods in the
province.
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we therefore expect the spillovers to be higher for geographically as well
as culturally close countries.
We test our model on a sample of post-communist counties during
the 1990s and 2000s. We focus on these countries because virtually all
of them at least attempted to implement economic and political reforms
during this period. The reform strategies as well as their outcomes, how-
ever, differed substantially across countries. This sample thus offers suf-
ficient variation in the reform programs, both in the economic and polit-
ical domain.
2.4 Data
Our analysis is carried out with 29 post-communist countries.8 We con-
sider political and economic reforms that started in these countries in
the early 1990s. While some countries implemented wide-ranging re-
forms relatively quickly, others proceeded more gradually and/or expe-
rienced set-backs and reform reversals. Correspondingly, our data cover
the years 1990 to 2008. We use 2008 as the cut-off year to ensure that
we capture the reform period but avoid including the current economic
and financial crisis. We only consider spillovers among post-communist
countries and thus ignore the rest of the world. This is due to the fact
that the experience of countries with similar starting position and under-
going similar changes is likely to be more relevant than the experience of
established democracies and market economies.
To capture the countries’ progress in implementing market-oriented
policies, we use the average of eight progress-in-transition indicator
compiled and published annually by the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD).9 We use the average Freedom House
8Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedo-
nia, Moldova, Mongolia, Monte Negro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
9These indicators measure each country’s progress in the following fields: price liber-
alization, foreign exchange and trade liberalization, small scale privatization, large scale
privatization, enterprise reform, competition policy, banking reform, and security mar-
kets and non-banking financial institutions. Each indicators ranges from 1 (unreformed
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democracy index10 to take account of the progress in democratization.
Finally, we identify periods of war using the Correlates of War (2010)
dataset.
2.5 Methodology
Our theoretical model predicts the existence of informational spillovers
with respect to policy reform and also that these should decline with
the distance between countries. The distance, furthermore, can be inter-
preted as not only the geographic distance but also as cultural proximity
or possessing common historical legacies. In order to take account of this,
our analytical approach combines two well know empirical models: the
spatiotemporal autoregressive model (STAR) and the gravity model. We
start by describing the latter and then discuss how our approach com-
pares to the former.
The gravity model (see Baldwin and Taglioni, 2005, and the refer-
ences therein) is widely used in the international trade literature, where
it is used to explain bilateral trade flows between pairs of countries (later
applications used it also to analyze foreign direct investment and migra-
tion flows). It takes its inspiration from the theory of gravity in physics,
where the force of gravity between two objects is computed as follows:11
Fi,j = G
MiMj
D2ij
(2.7)
The force of gravity, F , between objects i and j is thus proportional
to their masses, Mi and Mj , the gravitational constant, G, and inversely
centrally-planned economy) to 4+ (liberal market economy). As is common in this liter-
ature, we replace plus and minus distinctions by adding and subtracting 0.33 (so that 4+
becomes 4.33 while 4- is 3.67). We do not use the more recently available EBRD indicators of
infrastructure reform, only the eight original indicators measuring progress in Washington-
consensus reform (liberalization, stabilization and privatization).
10Specifically, this index is the average of the Freedom House measures of political free-
doms and civil liberties, rescaled so that higher values correspond to more democracy. It
ranges between 1 (autocracy) to 7 (fully free).
11This follows Baldwin and Taglioni (2005).
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proportional to the square of distance between them, Dij . Applied to the
study of economic phenomena, the gravity model takes the following
form (omitting time subscripts for simplicity):
Xij = A
YiYj
(Dijcultij)2
(2.8)
where Xij stands for the economic flow (such as exports or migra-
tion) between two countries, i and j, Yi is the economic equivalent of
physical mass of country i (in the context of trade and migration, mass
is typically proxied by total GDP and population, respectively), A is an
arbitrary constant term, and, finally, the denominator collects the vari-
ous distance terms, such as geographic distance and common cultural
and/or historical legacies.
In our analysis, we wish to capture the flow of information about
the outcome of policy reform between countries. The gravity relation
(now with the time subscripts added back) therefore can be rewritten as
follows:
Xij,t = A
Yi,t−1Yj,t−1
(Dijcultij)2
(2.9)
Xij,t now stands for the informational spillovers from country j to
country i at time t. This depends on the stock of policies implemented
in both countries in the preceding period, t− 1. Specifically, in line with
our theoretical model, we expect the informational spillover to be pro-
portional to the stock of policies in country j and inversely proportional
to the distance between them.
In formulating our analysis, we have to deal with specific characteris-
tics of the issue at hand. In particular, while we are interested in captur-
ing informational spillovers from j to i which in turn affect the overall
progress in policy reform in i, we can only observe the latter. This im-
plies that instead of observing the actual informational spillovers, Xij,t,
we observe
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Y˙i,t = f(X1,j,t, X2j,t...Xnj,t) (2.10)
where the left-hand side is the change in the policies in period t and
n is the number of countries in our sample. In other words, we assume
that the overall progress in reform in country i depends on the informa-
tional spillovers from all of the other countries. Furthermore, while we
cannot observe the individual arguments of the f(.) function (individual
spillovers), we assume the partial derivatives to be positive: the pres-
ence of particular policy in one country makes it more likely for other
countries to implement a similar reform. Thus, the underlying gravity
relation can be approximated by
Y˙i,t = A
Yi,t−1Yj,t−1
(Dijcultij)2
(2.11)
We linearize this relation by taking logs of both sides and augment
it to include the effects of mutual interactions between distance and re-
forms to better capture the effect of distance. Using lower case letters to
denote logs, our baseline regression becomes
4yi,t = α+ β1yi,t−1 + β2yj,t−1 + β3 ∗ dij + β4 ∗ contiguityij
+β5 ∗ smcntryij + β6yj,t−1 ∗ distij + β7yj,t−1 ∗ contiguityij
+β8yj,t−1 ∗ smcntryij + β9warit + β10warjt + ηi + υt + it(2.12)
The dependent variable is the log-difference in the index of policies
(see below) in country i during period t. The first row collects the stan-
dard gravity variables: indexes of policies in countries i and j, the dis-
tance between the two countries, and dummies for contiguity (sharing
a common border) and belonging to the same country in the past (for-
mer Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). Because the depen-
dent variable captures the overall progress in policy reform rather than
the informational spillover between the two countries, the second row
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introduces interaction terms between the policy index in country j and
the distance terms. Finally, we also control for the possibility that either
country can be involved in a military conflict, and introduce country and
year fixed effects (ηi and υt respectively).
The terms in the second row of the preceding equation are essentially
the same as the spatial lags used in the STAR (spatiotemporal autore-
gressive) model. That model is used for analyses involving regional (ge-
ographic) data that are thought to display correlation of residuals among
adjacent or nearby regions (this correlation can be contemporaneous or
can involve also temporal lags).12 There are several differences between
our model and the STAR model. First, while the unit of observations in
our approach is a pair of countries, the STAR model regresses the out-
come of interest on the sum of all spatial lags, thus allowing the effects of
individual counterparts to cancel out. In other words, our specification
is more disaggregate than the typical STAR model.
Second, our approach is more flexible in that it allows us to consider
spillovers from adjacent as well as distant regions, it facilitates the use of
multiple distance measures (geographical distance, contiguity and com-
mon history in our case), and it is consistent with countries having differ-
ent number of neighbors. The STAR model, in contrast, typically allows
for only one type of spillover at a time, such as from contiguous regions,
weighted by geographical distance or from regions that are culturally or
linguistically close (see, for example, Table 3 in Becker et al., 2009). In
case of contiguity, furthermore, it is common to normalize the weight of
all neighboring regions to unity so that the impact of a particular region
on another depends on the number of other contiguous regions that the
region in question has.
Third, a potentially important drawback of the STAR model is that it
introduces spatial lags (interactions between the variables of interest and
the various distance measures used as weights) without also including
the distance terms on their own. Finding, for example, that the spatial
lag weighed by distance is negative may be driven by the fact that poli-
12Recent applications of this model in economics are Becker, Egger and Seidel (2009)
and Bartz and Fuchs-Schndeln (2012).
64
cies in other countries have a negative effect in general, without taking
account of distance, that countries that are relatively remote implement
less reform, or that the effect of other countries’ policies declines with
distance. Without including the original terms as well as the interactions,
these three possible explanations cannot be disentangled.
A specific feature of our analysis is that although we consider all
possible pairs of countries, we only observe the change of policies in
each country and year rather than the actual informational spillover be-
tween the two countries. This implies that while we have 12-13 thou-
sand pairs of countries, we only have 580 unique observations of re-
form progress (29 countries and 20 years), the dependent variable. OLS,
therefore, would produce standard errors that are incorrectly estimated
(biased downwards). We therefore present regression results obtained
with cluster-robust standard errors, with country-year combinations set
as primary sampling units.
Note that we carry out our analysis with policy indexes rather than
with outcomes such as growth or inflation rates. Policy indexes assess
whether particular policies were put in place. Implementing policy re-
form may be associated with an initial cost (temporary worsening of eco-
nomic performance) followed by a subsequent improvement. For exam-
ple, moderate inflation following a policy of price liberalization may be
judged a success, since the alternative might be run-away hyperinflation.
Similarly, a recession in the wake of fiscal stabilization may be superior to
a failed stabilization resulting in a sovereign default and a much deeper
contraction.
2.6 Results
We consider two types of reform: economic and political one. The de-
pendent variable is always the log-difference of the index of economic
reform or democracy. We account for distance using three different mea-
sures: actual geographic distance, dummy for contiguity (having a com-
mon land border between two countries), and having common history
(being part of the same country, i.e. the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia
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and Czechoslovakia). We first introduce each on its own and then also
run a regression with all three measures at the same time. We always en-
ter the distance measure on its own as well as interacted with the index
of reform in country j.
The results are summarized in Table 12. Overall, they shows strong
support for our theoretical prediction in case of democratization and
somewhat weaker support in case of economic liberalization. The lagged
level of the reform index in country j is not consistently positive, indicat-
ing that spillovers, if any, indeed depend on distance. The coefficient for
geographical distance (on its own, not interacted with the index) is nega-
tive, significantly so for democracy. This can be interpreted as suggesting
that countries that are relatively remote (i.e. those that are far from other
countries in the sample) tend to reform their policies more slowly. The
interaction between distance and both reform indexes is also negative,
again significantly so for democracy: the impact of political liberalization
in other countries declines with distance. The common border dummy is
positive and significant for democracy while the same-country dummy
is positive and significant for both indexes. Hence, countries that share
borders or historical legacies with more countries tend to reform faster,
especially with respect to democratization. This is similar to the neg-
ative effect of distance: countries that are relatively distant (geographi-
cally or culturally) tend to experience less spillovers than other countries.
The interactions with the policy indexes reinforce this effect further: the
spillovers in terms of political liberalization increase both with common
border and common history, while only the latter appears important for
economic liberalization.
Looking at the remaining variables, the lagged level of either index in
country i is always strongly significant and has a negative effect on fur-
ther progress. This stems from the fact that both indexes are bound from
above. Therefore countries that have already achieved a relatively high
degree of economic or political freedom can only experience incremental
further progress. The effect of war in country i is negative and always
very strongly significant: countries at war tend to postpone reform. In
contrast, war in country j seems to matter little.
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2.7 Conclusions
We address the question of what drives the apparent waves of political
and economic changes that have been observed repeatedly throughout
history. We argue that the reform waves reflect learning and resolution of
uncertainty about the outcome of reforms, a phenomenon which we de-
note informational spillovers. Observing the outcome of reforms imple-
mented elsewhere thus reduces uncertainty and helps voters and policy
makers make better informed decisions. In this way, a (relatively) suc-
cessful reform in one country increases the probability that other coun-
tries implement the same or similar reform. Conversely, a reform effort
that played out badly in one country would discourage reforms else-
where.
To illustrate this mechanism, we first formulate a simple model of re-
form spillovers. The model demonstrates that countries can reduce un-
certainty about the reform outcome by observing the experience of other
countries that implemented the same or similar reform earlier. This in
turn should help reduce the status-quo bias highlighted in the previous
literature.
We test our model’s predictions on a sample of countries that im-
plemented political and economic reforms during the 1990s and 2000s:
the formerly communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. We
find strong support for the presence of spillovers in reform, especially
when considering democratization. We also confirm spillovers in eco-
nomic liberalization, although here the results are somewhat weaker and
less clear-cut. Our findings are thus in line with those of Meseguer (2006)
and Gassebner et al. (2011), who find spillovers with respect to economic
reform, or Becker et al. (2009) who find them with respect to corruption.
We believe we are the first to consider also political changes. Impor-
tantly, our results suggest that spillovers are even more important in the
political domain than with respect to economic reform.
Our findings suggest that the experience of other countries indeed
plays an important role in mobilizing support and maintaining the mo-
mentum for reform. The fact that spillovers appear especially impor-
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tant with respect to political reform should not come as surprising. The
success of political reform crucially hinges on the ability of the reform-
ers to garner and maintain popular support for their cause. This is a
standard collective action problem: while many would benefit from the
changes, few are willing to risk life and limb to make change happen
if the outcome is highly uncertain. Observing successful democratiza-
tions in other countries helps reduce the uncertainty and thus reduces
the underlying collective action problem. Learning from the experience
of others thus is an important way of breaking the status-quo bias.
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Table 12: Spillovers with respect to Democratization
4yi,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
yi,t−1 -.2967*** -.2962*** -.2961*** -.29689***
(.0556) (.0556) (.0555) (.05560)
yj,t−1 .0786*** -.0020** -.0014* .06278*
(.0270) (.0010) (.0007) (.03518)
Distance -.0079*** -.00709**
(.0029) (.00366)
Contiguity .0105** .00002
(.0046) (.00573)
Same country .0183*** .00833
(.0072) (.00740)
yi,t−1 ∗ distij -.0106*** -.00859*
(.0037) (.00463)
yj,t−1 ∗ contiguity .0149** -.00039
(.0066) (.00885)
yj,t−1 ∗ smcntry .0359*** .02285
(.0141) (.01448)
Wari -.1837*** -.1832*** -.1832*** -.18350***
(.0673) (.0673) (.0673) (.06725)
Warj .0012 -.0001 .0019 .00241
(.0016) (.0015) (.0017) (.00178)
Constant .3469*** .2890*** .2903*** .34061***
(.0906) (.0899) (.0900) (.08990)
R2 0.4477 0.4473 0.4475 0.4478
Observations 13,107 13,107 13,107 13,107
PSUs 580 580 580 580
Countries 29 29 29 29
Years 20 20 20 20
Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** sig-
nificant at 1%. All variables are in logs, except dummy variables. The dependent
variable is the log-difference of the variable indicated in the column heading.
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Table 13: Spillovers with respect to Democratization
4yi,t (5) (6) (7) (8)
yi,t−1 -.3990*** -.3991*** -.3982*** -.39755***
(.0473) (.0471) (.0471) (.04694)
yj,t−1 .0310 .0022 -.0008 .02393
(.0259) (.0016) (.0006) (.04229)
Distance -.0029 -.00318
(.0026) (.00418)
Contiguity -.0086 -.01787
(.0080) (.01105)
Same country .0200*** .02254***
(.0064) (.00803)
yi,t−1 ∗ distij -.0041 -.00298
(.0035) (.00550)
yj,t−1 ∗ contiguity -.0086 -.02178*
(.0092) (.01322)
yj,t−1 ∗ smcntry .0384*** .04333***
(.0121) (.01370)
Wari -.3491*** -.3491*** -.3473*** -.34696***
(.0702) (.0702) (.0701) (.07000)
Warj .0040 .0037 .0079*** .00858
(.0025) (.0024) (.0031) (.00320)
Constant -.2100 -.2370 -.2130 -.18558
(.1528) (.1479) (.1467) (.14919)
R2 0.6068 0.6068 0.6075 0.6079
Observations 12,705 12,705 12,705 12,705
PSUs 580 580 580 580
Countries 29 29 29 29
Years 20 20 20 20
Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** sig-
nificant at 1%. All variables are in logs, except dummy variables. The dependent
variable is the log-difference of the variable indicated in the column heading.
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Chapter 3
Cultural Interactions and
Imperial Legacies: A
within-country analysis
with Social Network data
3.1 Introduction
A growing body of literature argues for the beneficial effects on develop-
ment of generalized trust, or trust between strangers. Higher-trust soci-
eties enjoy lower transaction costs to economic activity, more investment,
a more stable financial and commercial environment and, ultimately,
higher levels of economic growth. A society’s stock of generalized trust
becomes even more important there when other formal institutions in-
dispensable for the market economy are missing or working inefficiently
as in the case of transitional economies.
While analyzing the determinants of trust, culture as a measure of
common norms of behavior is taken into account. The path development
of trust levels has deeper roots on shared cultural norms of a society
where religion among others is argued to play a significant role.
Since the seminal work of of AJR (2001) the long historical context of a
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country and the effect on institutional framework has come to attention.
Although transition economies are argued to lack on generalized trust
(Raiser and al 2004) little attention have been given to historical determi-
nants for this countries. Their institutional and economic performance
have been investigated only with reference to the legacies of the commu-
nist rule. Roland (2004) underlines the slow moving aspect of informal
institutions and how this affect reform outcomes in transition. This re-
search brings attention to the role played by long term history, therefore
cultural roots, on today trust outcomes, considered as an informal insti-
tution, with a focus on a (ex) transition country: Romania. This country
appears a very interesting natural experiment in the field of historical
analysis of institutional behavior. Since unified Romania have experi-
enced the common faith of communist rule for over fifty years, almost
fifteen years of transition toward the market economy and EU standards
of accession and share a present status as a member of European commu-
nity. But before unification and, for centuries this region have been under
the rule of Empires struggling for power in Eastern Europe. Two of the
three main regions in the country, Wallachia and Moldavia have been
ruled by the Ottomans while Transylvania by the Habsburgs. We use a
geographical information approach and new data as proxy for growth to
investigate the differences that these imperial powers may have created
on country’s levels of generalized trust.
3.2 Literature Review
Recent literature has devoted a great deal of attention to the concept of
social capital, defined by Putnam (1993) as the ‘features of social organi-
zation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordina-
tion and cooperation for mutual benefit.’ Fukuyama (1996) argues that
social capital stems from the existence of trust in a society, and is likewise
determined by common norms of cooperative behavior and ethical val-
ues. In particular, generalized trust, or trust in strangers, been brought to
attention as an important constituent of social capital, and determinant
of economic development.
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A number of studies have shown generalized trust to have a posi-
tive and significant relationship with income level (Knack and Keefer,
1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). The literature argues that ‘high-trust’ soci-
eties have lower transaction costs, which lead in turn to a better environ-
ment for investment and trade, and a better-performing economy over-
all. Williamson(2009) argues that transaction costs govern most mun-
dane transactions. As transaction costs are higher were the rule of law
is not established, and given that institutional quality is associated with
low levels of generalized trust, high-trust societies benefit from lower
transaction costs.
Analyzing generalized trust as an enhancer of economic performance
and as a means to lower transaction costs becomes even more important
in the case of transitional economies. To switch economic and / or po-
litical systems, transitional societies must implement new formal institu-
tional frameworks. In the institutional chaos that typically accompanies
transition, informal norms of behavior and sociability play an impor-
tant role in shaping the transitional society’s developmental path. Trust,
which Arrow (1973) termed a “lubricant of the economy,” is particularly
crucial in influencing the future transformation of a transitional society.
Trust is especially influential for reform implementation and for the ef-
fective allocation of public resources and foreign capital.
That generalized trust is crucial for a society’s path of economic
and political development has been widely documented in the existing
literature. Most famously, historical, country-level differences in reli-
gious traditions have been associated with variance in levels of interper-
sonal trust, as well as with differential levels of economic development.
Following the early ideas of Weber ([YEAR]), the literature has placed
particular emphasis on the normative differences between egalitarian
Protestantism and hierarchical Catholicism (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama
1995; La Porta et al 1997; Putnam 2000; Zak and Knack 2001). Gener-
alized trust is not only a determinant of the institutional and political
environment however: different governance practices may act to influ-
ence generalized trust. Pagden (1988) provides such an example in his
description of how Aragonese rulers acted to rend the fabric of civil soci-
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ety in 18th Century Naples, a development whose consequences possibly
last into the present.
As previously hinted, regional differences in social capital and gener-
alized trust have received ample attention in the case of Western Europe,
with a particular focus on the Italian case. In recent years, a secondary
regional focus, on South Eastern Europe, has emerged in the literature
on social capital on the continent. Variations in the experience of post-
Communist transition in Eastern Europe, together with the accession of
many Eastern European countries to the European Union, have brought
to the fore the need to study informal social structures and their interac-
tion with political processes. The urgency of understanding the role of
informal networks in economic life as well as in the unfolding of political
process has become especially poignant in the Southern part of the East-
ern European region, particularly afflicted by a syndrome of corruption,
inter-ethnic conflict, chronic distrust of government, an overall level of
malaise that does not bode well for the future of the region. It is to the
understanding of this especially complex part of Europe that our article
seeks to make a scholarly contribution.
The study argue that long-term history is a determining factor of cul-
tural outcomes for a set of transition economies. Similarly, Karaja (2012)
showed variation in the reported frequency of bribing local officials in
Eastern European countries with different historical legacies in the re-
gion. Our aim is to show trace of history on current social structure in
the context of South Eastern Europe. To further focus our analysis, we
choose to limit its scope to Romania, a particularly interesting case study
of a currently-existing state previously divided between two empires
3.2.1 Romania: Romania and the Principalities
For virtually the entirety of the Modern era, the history of Romania’s
constituent regions (Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania) bears the
imprint of its two neighbor macro-states, the Habsburg (later Austro-
Hungarian) and Ottoman Empires. Wallachia and Moldavia, later joined
together as the Romanian Principalities, shared approximately the same
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vassal status to the Ottoman Empire. Conversely, Transylvania became
a part of the Habsburg Empire with the Habsburg victory at the Battle
of Vienna, maintaining its connection to Habsburg rule (in the Austro-
Hungarian empire after 1848) until the early Twentieth Century.
Modern Romania was constituted in two stages. First, Moldavia and
Wallachia were joined together in the Romanian Principalities (later the
Kingdom of Romania) in a gradual process lasting from 1859 to 1881. The
second unification came four decades later, when Transylvania and the
Principalities were joined after the First World war. This second develop-
ment was officialized in the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. The establishment of
“Greater Romania” created an effectively new state, divided internally in
parts of similar size by what had long been the border of two of Europe’s
most long-lived Empires. At the time Romania paralleled the example
of Yugoslavia, another state created from the remnants of erstwhile em-
pires.
[....]
Unlike Yugoslavia, Romania survived as a unitary state into the
Twenty-First Century. After a loss of territory in the wake of the Second
World War (when Romania fought on the side of the Axis), the state’s
borders were stabilized to a shape that has remained essentially constant
for the past seven decades. But even though Romania’s main internal
border did not re-assert itself in the same way as happened in the case
of former Yugoslavia, the border remains salient to this day. Indeed, a
World Bank study (Amelina, Chiribuca and Knack, 2004) investigating
social features and economic outcomes of the Romanian found important
differences in social capital and interpersonal trust between the country’s
historical regions. In this work we aim to bring additional, finer-grained
evidence as to the importance of Romania’s former division, by harness-
ing the power of a novel dataset.
[...]
Before the unification and the subsequent common Communist rule
the three main regions of the country, namely Wallachia, Moldavia and
Transylvania have experienced dissimilar historical faith. Wallachia and
Moldavia have shared jointly the status of vassal areas of the Ottoman
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Empire while Transylvania (and Banat and Southern Bukovina) has been
mainly under Hungarian and Habsburg rule under the same period and
formally occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918. Differ-
ent cultural and institutional settings of the two rules are argued here to
have shaped the region. Among others the role of Protestantism and the
earlier abolition of serfdom1. Even when occupied from the Ottoman em-
pire and ruled as a vassal state as the other two provinces, Transylvania
was ruled from Hungarian princes that kept implementing the Hungar-
ian legacy while still fighting the Habsburgs (Magocsi 1993)
[As argued by Fukuyama (1996), Knack and Keefer (2002), Rothen-
stein (2011) among others higher (lower) quality of public bureaucracy is
linked with higher (lower) interpersonal trust]
3.3 Data
This analysis use data from CouchSurfing.org, an online network fa-
cilitating the exchange of hospitality between individuals interested in
hosting others and individuals looking for a place to spend the night
while travelling. Previous exploratory work (Vaicekauskas 2010) has
pointed out the existence of a statistical association at the country-level
between population-adjusted levels of CouchSurfing membership and
generalized trust, as measured by the European Social Survey. Couch-
Surfing currently has close to 19,000 members in Romania, their location
recorded to the level of the city or village in which they live. The preci-
sion with which location is recorded, coupled with the large number of
individual members suggests the potential usefulness of using this orga-
nization’s membership as a fine-grained, behavioral proxy for general-
ized trust, to enrich our understanding of the trace of Empires in current
Romanian society.
Beyond describing the evolution of one Internet-based organization
in Romania, our analysis is intended as illustration of the potential use-
fulness for the measurement of social institutions of data collected by
1Serfdom was abolished by the Habsbourg Emperor Joseph II in Transylvania in 1785
while it survived unti 1864 in Wallachia and Moldavia
76
Internet ventures.The focus on Romania because of its historical back-
ground yielding a clearly-visible internal border with respect to institu-
tions, along the Carpathian mountain range. The choice to use data from
CouchSurfing is motivated by the organization’s activity particular sen-
sitivity to the informal institutions with which this article is concerned.
Arguably, becoming a CouchSurfer even nominally - creating a pro-
file on the website CouchSurfing.com - represents an act of trust in it-
self. One has to at least take into consideration the possibility of inter-
acting with unknown others, and be willing to tolerate the prospective
risks inherent in the worst-case scenarios hospitality interactions may
elicit. It thus seems reasonable to assume that CouchSurfers are more
trusting than the general population from which they are drawn. Given
the hypothesized difference in trust between the Romanian Principalities
and Transylvania, we thus expect CouchSurfing membership to be more
prevalent inside the Carpathian arc than in the extra-Carpathian regions
of Romania.
In addition to adducing further evidence to the lasting impact of old
Imperial institutions on the current social climate in Romanian regions,
we explore in more depth geographical differences in behavior for per-
sons who have joined CouchSurfing. Here contrast two potential ac-
counts with respect to the relation between levels of generalized trust
reported in the population and the behavior of individuals who select
themselves as members of a trust network. A first explanation would
suggest that local CouchSurfing communities should replicate larger so-
cietal divisions: members from low-trusting areas should trust less them-
selves, whereas those members coming from high-trust areas should
trust more.
A countervailing hypothesis emerges if one considers the interaction
between individual and environment however. Arguably, the lower the
level of generalized trust in a society, the more dangerous hosting a
stranger appears to the members of that society. Individuals alone do
not establish how “foolish” engaging in such interactions is, however:
the potential risks are framed in part through a collective understand-
ing created by everyday discourse. Because such a consensus is more
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likely to be more negative in societies lower in generalized trust, those ac-
tors who are considering joining CouchSurfing in such societies may face
higher “resistance,” in the form of a more acute perception of risk. As a
result, it may be the case that only the most trusting individuals from
a low-trust society would join the organization, whereas CouchSurfing
may draw more representative sample of individuals from a higher-trust
context. We therefore also consider the possibility of a reverse associa-
tion between local generalized trust and willingness to trust others once
one has joined CouchSurfing.
3.4 Methods
The primary data consists of a set of X data points given in terms of
the latitude and longitude coordinates of CouchSurfers’ place of resi-
dence. The data contain Y unique values, corresponding to the cities,
towns and villages in which members of the organization live, indexed
according to the organization’s own geographical schema. We calculate
the rate of CouchSurfing “prevalence” in a certain area, the population
of which we obtained from the World Gazetteer, a worldwide geograph-
ical database of inhabited place. We matched each place of residence
listed in the CouchSurfing data with the nearest Romanian locality listed
in the World Gazetteer. These Z localities represent our unit of analy-
sis. While we argue that CouchSurfing membership acts as a measure
of trust in strangers, we are also cognizant of the many causes that may
result in one’s joining CouchSurfing, such as one’s desire to experience
cultural diversity, the community that local CouchSurfing networks can
provide, or the economic incentive offered by the prospect of free lodg-
ing while traveling. Thus I expect CouchSurfing membership levels to
be a noisy measure. To smooth out the variations due to other causes
we first present measures of CouchSurfing membership aggregated at
county level.
To provide a spatially-continuous, better-resolution indicator of trust,
we likewise compute a Kriege, a technique used in Geographic Informa-
tion Systems. [more on krieges here]
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3.5 Results
Figure 9 shows the density of CouchSurfing membership (CouchSurfers
/ population) for the forty Romanian counties and the Municipality of
Bucharest. A clear discrepancy appears at the border between regions
under former Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman suzerainty. The six coun-
ties where CouchSurfing is least prevalent are all in Wallachia: Mehed-
inti, Olt, Giurgiu, Calarasi, Ialomita, and Buzau. The Carpathian bor-
der forms a clear delimitation of a contiguous region of higher levels
of membership in Transylvania, compared to membership in the for-
mer Principalities. The mapping between Romania’s historical provinces
and CouchSurfing membership is not perfect, however. In particu-
lar, Bucharest and Iasi stand out as high-membership regions. Indeed,
Bucharest alone has more CouchSurfers (number) than any of the other
regions. As Figure 10 reveals, including Bucharest in the regional to-
tal for Wallachia puts this region ahead of Transylvania in terms of lev-
els of CouchSurfing membership, despite the clear trend towards lower
membership in the rest of Wallachia. We argue that Bucharest should
be treated separately from the rest of Romania however. Because it is
Romania’s political, administrative, economic and educational center,
Bucharest has attracted migrants from the rest of Romania, while also
creating its own social dynamics. Because of its special status – often
the case with capital cities – Bucharest thus appears as a class of its own,
and its inclusion skews the results of our analysis. With Bucharest taken
out of the sample (Figure 10b), the results show Wallachia and Moldova
close together in average CouchSurfing membership of just under 50
CouchSurfers / 100,000 persons, whereas Transylvania shows triple the
amount. As a robustness check we also took out the largest cities in
Moldova (Iasi) and Transylvania (Cluj-Napoca) from our analysis. The
results (Figure 10c) show qualitatively-similar findings. The dispropor-
tionate impact of Bucharest on the previous analysis does suggest one
potential alternative explanation for discrepancies between Transylva-
nia and the rest of Romania. CouchSurfing is primarily associated with
large cities, and Transylvania has a higher level of urbanization than the
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rest of Romania. Thus, the existence of more cities in Transylvania may
drive the prevalence of CouchSurfing there, rather than the fact that such
cities are in Transylvania. Were this to be the case, we would expect to
see similar dynamics for cities South and North of the prior border be-
tween the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. We present the results of
an analysis meant to answer such question in Figure 11. Here we re-
port on an Ordinary Kriege Interpolation of CouchSurfing prevalence
levels across all Romanian localities in the World Gazetteer. Applying
this technique allows us to obtain a smoothed surface whose height en-
codes differential levels of CouchSurfing membership, taking advantage
of the fact that levels in the variable of interest are likely to display local
dependency structures. The interpolated levels of CouchSurfing preva-
lence shown in Figure 11 display peaks around some of the large Roma-
nian cities, suggesting that, rather unsurprisingly, CouchSurfing mem-
bership is more prevalent in some large cities. What is notable thus, is not
the fact that peaks in membership levels are concentrated around some
large centers of population, but the notable absence of many cities. The
map shows clear peaks around the Transylvanian towns of Cluj-Napoca,
Brasov, Sibiu, Timisoara, Arad – even the small Northern town of Sighetu
Marmatiei. The scarcity of peaks in the former Ottoman parts of Roma-
nia is conspicuous. The only two cities visible on the map are Bucharest
and Iasi show elevation gain in the smoothed surface, their higher levels
of membership tempered by the very low levels of CouchSurfing mem-
bership in the surrounding areas. Other cities of comparable size to their
earlier-mentioned Transylvanian counterparts are strikingly absent from
the map: the estimated surface is flat around Constanta, Craiova, Pitesti,
Ploiesti, Galati, Bacau or Suceava. This suggests that while CouchSurf-
ing’s membership is indeed associated with cities, Transylvanian cities
are likelier to have higher levels of membership than similarly-sized
cities from the Principalities.
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics by Region.
Table 15: Recorded Ties Between CouchSurfers, by region.
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Figure 8: CouchSurfing Membership Density in Romanian Counties
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Figure 9: CouchSurfing Membership Density in Romanian Counties
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Figure 10: Mean CouchSurfing membership, per 100,000 inhabitants
84
Figure 11: Ordinary Kriege Prediction of CouchSurfing Prevalence in Ro-
mania
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Chapter 4
Financial reforms and
Historical Legacies in
Transition
4.1 Introduction
We analyze the effects of financial reform and development on eco-
nomic growth in conjunction with the historical legacies of nine CEE
and CIS countries. Financial development positively affects economic
growth and furthermore this link become crucial for this set countries
that started the conversion to a market economy system with much un-
developed financial systems. Financial reform on the other hand is of
crucial as stimulus for the development of a modern financial sector.
In this work we use a new dataset that quantifies the level of financial
reform in these countries. However, these measures are only de jure. In-
formal institutions such as corruption, rule of law, etc as well as attitudes
and culture may affect the way these de jure reforms are translated into
de facto reform. We believe that the historical legacies of these countries
shaped in a large proportion the informal institutions of these countries.
We investigate the relationship between de jure and de facto financial re-
form on economic growth using a constructed index (by the author) of
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historical legacies to proxy for de facto reform (interacting de jure reform
and historical legacies).
4.2 Related Literature
4.2.1 From institutions to growth
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are
the humanly devised constrains that shape human interaction” (Douglas
North, 1990). They encompass informal constraints (norms and beliefs)
and formal constraints (rules and organizations, which are exogenous
to the individual), which “conjointly generate a regularity of behavior”
(Greif (2006)). Furthermore, ‘new institutional economics’ emphasize the
role of institutions as social arrangements that reduce transaction costs
and promote economic growth. Institutions matter and can be the “rules
of the game” as argued by Williamson (2005) when dealing with eco-
nomics of governance.
As early as 1776 scholars such as Adam Smith, Jon Locke and John
Stuart Mill assert the importance of economic institutions. The Coase
Theorem (Coase 1960) highlights economic institutions as a crucial aspect
for attaining social efficiency when dealing with potential externalities.
Demsetz (1967), De Sotto (2000), Acemoglu and al. (2002 2004 2008) un-
derline the importance of economic institutions in influencing the struc-
ture of economic incentives in a society. North and Thomas (The Rise of
The Western World: A New Economic History”), as cited by Acemoglu
and al. (2004), argue that factors like innovation, capital accumulation
and education are not causes of growth but ‘they are growth’ and the
fundamental explanation for comparative growth is to be found in insti-
tutions. Cross-country differences in output per worker can be only par-
tially explained by cross-country variation in the stock of physical and
human capital, and these stocks fail to converge over time. The findings
of Hall and Jones (1999) suggest that the differences in capital accumu-
lation, productivity, and output per worker, across 127 countries, are in
fact, driven by differences in social infrastructure, namely institutions
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and government policies.
Tabellini (2008) explains the divergence of several political, institu-
tional and economic outcomes in regions of Europe by accounting for
their culture. Translated in individual values, culture represents the
channel through which history can potentially affect institutional out-
come. The author remarks differences in bureaucracy, in countries with
similar legislations and resources, and underlines the importance of his-
torical legacy persistence on policies. Rodrik et al (2004), using instru-
mental variables, estimate the contributions of institutions, geography
and trade in determining income levels around the world. Moreover,
they show that the quality of institutions, in particular for property rights
and the rule of law, matters more than the other factors.
Several EBRD Transition Reports maintain the vital importance of
market and state institutions for transition economies. Institutions can
provide incentives for investment and innovation, which constitute im-
portant sources of growth. Furthermore, in transition countries with
strong institutions, politicians’ ability to extract rents is lower.1 Institu-
tional building for transition economies is also strongly advocated by
Roland, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2009, Polishchuk, 2001, Fischer Sahay 2004.
Beck and Laeven (2006) show the importance of institutional develop-
ment for the economic growth in 24 former Communist transition coun-
tries. Moreover, they advance the idea that the economies relying more
on natural resources and in which the socialist elites were more en-
trenched (more years under socialism), were less likely to develop mar-
ket oriented institutions and to achieve economic development.
So far, in the economic literature, little attention was paid to the po-
tential impact of historical legacies on the institutional development and
economic growth of the transition economies of Eastern Europe. Impor-
tant exceptions are the contribution of Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007), and the
recent work of Grosejan on the effect of historical spatial proximity on
cultural transmission (2011) and the persistence of former ottoman insti-
tutions on current financial sector development (2011).
1EBRD 2009
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4.2.2 Financial sector reform and growth in transition
Understanding the relationship between the legal environment, financial
development and economic growth has important policy and conceptual
consequences. The interest in determining the legal rules that best help
financial systems to develop and thus help economic growth started in
the 1990s, building upon the emerging emphasis on institutions.
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1997) and LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes
et al. (1998) use data on the legal systems of forty nine countries and
show that legal systems that are better at rigorously protecting creditors
and enforcing contracts, encourage the functioning and development of
debt and equity markets. Levine (1998), in a cross-country analysis, finds
that differences in the legal rights of creditors and the efficiency of their
enforcement explains a large part of the differences in financial develop-
ment among countries. Moreover, the author uses the origin of the legal
systems as instrumental variable to identify the part of financial develop-
ment that affects long-run economic growth, capital accumulation, and
productivity growth finding a positive relationship.
Financial sectors are both overseen and used by national govern-
ments. Governments directly and indirectly set and enforce the regu-
lation of financial institutions. But governments also use the financial
sectors to borrow; and historically (although it still happens nowadays)
they can directly intervene in the functioning of the domestic financial
systems, for example by controlling parts of the banking sector or by di-
recting the allocation of credit (Spratt (2009)).
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argue that “financial repression”
is directly responsible for lower growth as it prevents financial sectors
from performing their roles. This influential hypothesis represented the
framework for financial sector development throughout the world, over
the past decades. Financial liberalization is likely to cause an increase
in the size of the financial sector. Some of the theoretical arguments
that support a positive relationship between financial liberalization, fi-
nancial development and growth are as follows. More competition in
the financial sector increases loans and deposits, and concomitantly, the
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pressure put on profit margins, may decrease the rates on loans, thus
stimulating savings and investments. Moreover, financial intermediaries
are pushed to become more efficient and to reduce overhead costs, im-
prove risk management and offer new instruments and services (Hermes
and Lensink (2008)).
On the other hand, financial liberalization may leave financial sys-
tems more fragile and exposed to crises leading to economic and finan-
cial disasters. The asymmetric information problems might become even
worse through the reduction of relationship lending and information
capital, when competition is increased. Reduced margins leave banks
more fragile and predisposed to excessive risk-taking, thus increasing
the number of bank failures or even bank runs. Demirguc-Kunt and De-
tragiache (1999) use interest rate controls as proxy for financial liberal-
ization and find that financial liberalization significantly increases the
probability of banking crises, in a sample of both developed and devel-
oping countries, but that this tendency can be lowered by improving in-
stitutional quality (for example, less corruption or stronger rule of law).
Thus, a strong set of financial market regulations is necessary in order to
reduce the negative effects of financial liberalization.
After the fall of their Communist regimes, the countries from CEE
and ex-USSR liberalized their financial sectors, although not to the same
degree, or by employing the same set of policies. In the years prior to the
transition, capital was allocated by state-controlled banks, through cred-
its to state-owned enterprises. Credit evaluation and risk management
played no role in lending decisions while banking was often segmented
along functional lines. Household savings were collected by a state sav-
ings bank and often the result of the unavailability of consumer goods to
purchase.
The development of banking sectors in transition economies had sev-
eral stages. First, the establishment of commercial banks, second the re-
capitalization and restructuring of bank portfolios, and third the transfer
of ownership from the government-privatization. In the late 1990, early
2000 the former Communist countries made rapid progress in bank pri-
vatization often with the participation of foreign banks, although by tak-
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ing different approaches and with various degrees of success. However,
the ultimate goal of bank privatization in a transition country should be
banks’ independence from government or from clients, hard budget con-
straints and the capacity to manage financial risks. Bonin, Hasan et al.
(2004) using a sample of six developed Eastern European countries ob-
served over the 1994-2002 period, empirically find that privatizing state-
owned banks, by selling them to foreign investors, improves the perfor-
mance of the banking sector but does not improve the effectiveness of
financial intermediation.
4.3 Financial sector and Imperial narrative
4.3.1 Financial sector reform and economic growth
Financial sectors are both overseen and used by national governments.
Governments both directly and indirectly set and enforce the regulations
of financial institutions. Governments also borrow from the financial sec-
tors and historically, and sometimes even nowadays, governments can
intervene directly in the functioning of domestic financial systems, for
example by controlling parts of the banking sector or by directing the
allocation of credit (Spratt (2009)).
After the fall of the Communist regimes, the countries from CEE and
ex-USSR liberalized their financial sectors, although not to the same de-
gree, or by employing the same set of policies. In the years prior to the
transition, capital was allocated by state-controlled banks through cred-
its to state-owned enterprises. Credit evaluation and risk management
played no role in lending decisions while banking was often segmented
along functional lines. Household savings were collected by a state sav-
ings bank and often the result of the unavailability of consumer goods
to purchase. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that “financial
repression” is directly responsible for lower growth as it prevents finan-
cial sectors from performing their roles. This influential hypothesis has
represented a framework for the financial sector development through-
out the world, over the past decades. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache
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(1999) use interest rate controls as a proxy for financial liberalization and
find that financial liberalization significantly increases the probability of
banking crises, in a sample of both developed and developing countries,
but this tendency can be lowered by improving the quality of the institu-
tions (for example, less corruption or stronger rule of law).
An important angle on the financial sector development in the tran-
sition countries is related to the institutional changes and reforms that
reshaped financial intermediation in these countries in the years follow-
ing the fall of Communism. From the previous chapters, it seems that the
depth and the efficiency of the financial system can foster growth. The
development of banking sectors in transition economies usually had sev-
eral stages. First, the establishment of commercial banks, second the re-
capitalization and restructuring of bank portfolios and third the transfer
of ownership from the government-privatization. In the late 1990, early
2000 the former Communist countries made rapid progress in bank pri-
vatization often with the participation of foreign banks, although by tak-
ing different approaches and with various degrees of success. However,
the ultimate goal of bank privatization in a transition country should
be banks’ independence from government or from clients, hard budget
constraints and the capacity to manage financial risks. Bonin, Hasan et
al. (2004). using a sample of 6 developed Eastern European transition
countries during the period 1994-2002, empirically find that privatizing
state-owned banks by selling them to foreign investors improves the per-
formance of the banking sector. They find no evidence that privatization
improves the effectiveness of financial intermediation.
The effect of financial liberalization is likely to be an increase in the
size of the financial sector but it may also leave it more fragile and ex-
posed to crises. Some of the theoretical arguments that support a posi-
tive relationship between financial liberalization, financial development
and growth are as follows. More competition in the financial sector in-
creases rates and deposits, and concomitantly, the pressure put on profit
margins may decrease the rates on loans, thus stimulating savings and
investments. Moreover, financial intermediaries are pushed to become
more efficient and to reduce overhead costs, improve risk management
92
and offer new instruments and services (Hermes and Lensink (2008)).
On the other hand, it has been argued that there were cases when fi-
nancial liberalization led to economic and financial disasters and gener-
ally disappointing results. The asymmetric information problems might
become even worse through the reduction of relationship lending and
information capital, when competition is increased. Reduced margins
leaves banks more fragile and predisposed to excessive risk-taking, thus
increasing the number of bank failures or even bank runs in the economy.
Thus, a strong set of financial market regulations is necessary in order to
reduce the negative effects of financial liberalization.
4.3.2 Imperial power in CEE and CIS
Specific institutions may persist over time, especially informal ones, such
beliefs and social norms. These informal institutions affect the set of for-
mal ones evidenced in the literature to have a strong effect on growth-
among the others rule of law and corruption. Social norms and beliefs
are considered as direct channels of persistence of historical background
and historical legacies for the considered set of countries.
The present study agree with the Dimitrova-Grajzl tested conjecture
that the fall of the iron curtain laws accompanied with a desired di-
vergence from the socialist ideology therefore a reversal to pre-system
historical traditions norms and rules. According to EBRD Transition
report (1994) ”transition from a command to a market economy is the
movement towards a new system for the generation and allocation of
resources. It involves also changing and creating the institutional frame-
work. A major impediment to assess the role of institutions in explain-
ing economic performance during the transition refers to the difficulties
in identifying theoretically-sound measures of those institutions that are
relevant for growth (Coricelli et al. 2002). The EU accession process is
claimed to have a positive effect in terms of institutional framework be-
ing reforms required considerably more rigorous. On the other hand
progress on a set of Institutions is required for a definitive and posi-
tive outcome of the process, highlighting country’s specific peculiarities.
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Therefore historical background becomes furthermore important.
(Description of main Empires in the region)
4.4 Data
In our analysis we explore data from the following Eastern European
countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. We omit other coun-
tries from the Eastern region mainly because of the lack of data on finan-
cial reforms for these countries.
Ottoman index, Habsburg index, Prussia index and Russia index are
calculated indicators ranging from 0 to 1 for the duration of the respec-
tive empire’s rule in a country. The methodology used in computing
them is explained in more detail in the next section.
In order to quantify the various aspects of de jure financial sector re-
form we use indicators from the EBRD dataset described in the paper by
Abiad, Detragiache et al. (2008).
The financial reform index is based on seven dimensions of financial
sector policy: credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements,
interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking sec-
tor, capital account restrictions, prudential regulations and supervision
of the banking sector, securities market policy. Each country is assigned
a score along each of these dimensions, with zero for the highest degree
of financial repression and three or more for the highest degree of fi-
nancial liberalization. The aggregation of these seven variables offers a
single financial liberalization index, which in this paper was used as nor-
malized to one. The seven components of the financial reform index are
described below.
Credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements is an ag-
gregate measure of the extent to which a country requires the banks to
lend (sometimes at subsidized rates) to certain sectors such as manufac-
turing, agriculture or the government, and also a measure of the govern-
ment imposed ceilings on credit extended by the banks. It also includes
excessively high reserve requirements imposed on banks, for example,
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more than 20% reserve requirements is used as the highest threshold.
Based on these aspects each country is assigned a score between 0 and 4,
with 0 meaning fully repressed and 4 - fully liberalized. Credit ceilings-
one of the components of credit controls is coded as 0 is there are ceilings
on the expansion of bank credit and 1 if there are no restrictions.
Interest rate liberalization: this measure considers both lending and
deposit rates, ranking each of them into government set or subject to a
binding ceiling/floor, fluctuating within a band or freely floating. The
resulting measure ranges between 0 - fully repressed and 4-fully liberal-
ized. Interest rate controls are one of the most common forms of financial
repression even in developed countries.
Banking sector entry considers the extent to which the government
allows foreign banks, as well as, new domestic banks to enter the mar-
ket, whether there are restrictions on branching and if the government
allows the banks to engage in wide range of activities. The scores can
range between 0 and 5, 4 or 5 representing full liberalization and 0- full
repression.
State ownership in the banking sector is a relatively crude measure of
the control a country’s government can have over the credit allocation.
Due to lack of data sources on the state ownership of banks, this measure
makes only the following differentiations. A score of 3 means full liber-
alization, consistent with the state not owning any significant portion of
banks and/or public owned bank assets are less than 10%. Largely liber-
alized (score of 2) means that most banks are privately owned and/or the
proportion of public bank assets is between 10% and 25%. Partially re-
pressed (a score 1) means that most banks are privately owned but there
are still major banks that are state-owned and/or the percentage of pub-
lic bank assets is between 25-50%. Fully repressed (score 0) means that
major banks are all-state owned, or that the proportion of public bank
assets is between 50% and 100%.
Capital account restrictions include multiple exchange rates for vari-
ous transactions, transaction taxes, and restrictions on outflows/inflows
of capital, specifically regarding financial credits. Typically such mea-
sures are imposed in order to give the government a greater control over
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the flow of capital and greater control over the exchange rate. The range
is between 0 and 3, with 3 signifying full liberalization.
The measure securities markets refers to two sub-dimensions: gov-
ernment policies to encourage the development of securities markets,
and policies on the openness of the securities markets to foreign in-
vestors. A score of 4 or 5 indicates a fully liberalized economy and a
score of 0 a fully repressed one.
Prudential regulations and banking sector supervisions is a measure
(the only one in this set) that actually interprets a greater degree of gov-
ernment intervention as reform. The dimensions captured by it are:
whether the country adopts the capital adequacy ratios based on the
Basel I capital accord, whether the banking supervisory agency is inde-
pendent from the executive’s influence and if it has enough legal power,
whether certain financial institutions are exempt from supervisory over-
sight and how effective are the on and off-site examinations of banks.
The measure can take values between 6- highly regulated and 0 not reg-
ulated.
4.5 Methodology
Construction of historic legacy indeces
In this study we use the historic legacy index as previously constructed
by the author. [..] The hypothesis is, as evidenced in previous literature,
that the more time a country has spent under the rule of a certain empire
the stronger the influence of that empire’s culture and institutions is on
the country’s current culture and institutions. Furthermore, being under
occupation more recently plays a more important role than being under
occupation earlier. . Explain 1400 and 1918. Each year of occupation by
an empire, starting with 1400 and ending with 1918, is assigned a weight.
Next, we compute indices for each country and each empire by adding
the
For example, the weight of the Ottoman Empire for country i is com-
puted as:
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Index Ottomani =
year end Ottoman∑
j=year start Ottoman
value yearj
where “year start Ottoman” is the year when the Ottoman Empire’s
rule of country i has started and “year end Ottoman” is the year when
Ottoman Empire’s rule of country i has ended. However, there is no un-
derlying theory that could provide us insights into how to assign relative
importance to each year under occupation. While it seems obvious that
one year spend under an empire in the 1900s should matter more than
a year spent under occupation in the 1400s, it is not at all obvious how
much more it matters. Thus here, we introduce two ways of assigning
weights to the years under occupation. First we assume that the impor-
tance of years increases from past to present, following a linear trend.
Thus, the importance associated with year x is given by:
{
f(x) = 0 if x < 1400
f(x) = x− 1400 for x ≥ 1400
The resulting indexes for each country and each empire are normal-
ized to 1.
According to this definition, a country that was under the rule of an
empire for 100 years starting with the year 1400 would have an index of
0.037; a country a country that was under the rule of an empire for 100
years starting with the year 1818 would have an index of 0.388.
The second definition assumes that years closer to present are, in fact,
much more important than earlier years. According to the second defi-
nition, the importance assigned to each year is equal to the inverse of the
distance between 1989 and the year itself. The year 1989 was used be-
cause it represents the end of the Communism in these countries and the
beginning of our analysis of financial development, but also because it
yields a convenient shape to the importance function. The shape is simi-
lar to an exponential function, for which we observe a significant increase
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in importance for years after 1800. For both definitions, the country em-
pire weights are normalized to 1. Thus an empire would have a weight
of 1 for a country if that country was under the empire’s rule since 1400
until 1918.
4.6 Results
Table 16 presents correlation coefficients and their p-values between the
four historical legacies considered in this paper, calculated using the lin-
ear function explain in detail above, annual per capita GDP, annual eco-
nomic growth and various measures of financial reform in 11 transition
economies. There are strongly significant correlations between historic
legacies and per capita GDP. An Ottoman or Russian legacy is associ-
ated with lower per capita GDP, while a Habsburg or Prussian legacy is
associated with higher per capita GDP. While none of the historical lega-
cies is significantly correlated with the economic growth, there seem to
be influences on the level of financial reform. The aggregated financial
reform index is negatively correlated with an Ottoman legacy and pos-
itively correlated with a Prussian legacy. Both these results are statisti-
cally significant. Habsburg and Russian legacies are positively correlated
with financial reform, however not statistically significant.
Ottoman legacy is negatively correlated with all components of fi-
nancial reform with the exception of “international capital”, which is
positively correlated with the Ottoman legacy. These results are statis-
tically significant for 7 of the 9 components. Habsburg historical legacy
is significantly and negatively correlated with directed credits and credit
controls and significantly and positively correlated with credit ceiling,
interest rate controls, banking supervision and privatization. Prussian
legacy is positively correlated with all the financial reform indicators and
the correlations are significant for 7 of the 9. A Russian legacy is sig-
nificantly and positively correlated with directed credits, credit ceilings,
credit controls and interest rate controls.
Countries with Ottoman historical legacies are more likely to incur a
reversal in financial reforms, while countries with a Prussian legacy are
98
less likely to undergo such a process. The correlations are not significant
for countries with Habsburg or Russian historical legacies.
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Table 16: Correlations between historical legacies, economic growth and fi-
nancial reforms in Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.
Ottoman index Habsburg index Prussian index Russia index
gdp per capita -0.48*** 0.59*** 0.41*** -0.23***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
growth 0.05 -0.04 0.11 -0.05
(0.55) (0.60) (0.17) (0.53)
directed credits 0.08 -0.30*** 0.17** 0.32***
(0.34) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
credit ceilings -0.39*** 0.14* 0.09 0.21***
(0.00) (0.08) (0.27) (0.01)
credit controls -0.07 -0.21*** 0.18** 0.36***
(0.36) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
interest rate controls -0.56*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.20***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
entry barriers -0.15* -0.06 0.03 0.13*
(0.05) (0.44) (0.70) (0.10)
banking supervision -0.16** 0.14* 0.20* -0.10
(0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.19)
privatization -0.29*** 0.14* 0.23*** 0.07
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.35)
international capital 0.07* -0.11 0.26*** 0.01
(0.35) (0.18) (0.00) (0.92)
security markets -0.41*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.55)
financial reform index -0.32*** 0.11 0.31*** 0.11
(0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.16)
reversal 0.18** -0.03 -0.17** -0.04
(0.03) (0.75) (0.03) (0.66)
p-values in parentheses, level of significance denoted by * at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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